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surveillance-vs-democracy.lt.po: #score: 7336; @digest: e40ea6ee4664415e7cd40960402d7fb9; @id: 244251; @mdate: 2022-10-14T18:46:03Z; @size: 64382; @type: text/html; content-type: text/html; charset=utf-8; #keywords: sekimo (46055), duomenu (30464), whistleblowers (21823), theguardian (18871), nytimes (15870), verizon (15863), surveillance (15483), snowden (14246), aclu (12285), journalists (11474), remedy (11357), bitcoin (11121), dossiers (9974), href (7703), wired (7679), nsa (7375), cameras (7307), https (6958), police (6616), ldquo (6557), democracy (6438), government (6374), yra (6025), privacy (5838), recognition (5291), opinion (4584), phone (4508), collected (4384), 2013 (4137), rdquo (4135), national (3649), court (3407); surveillance-vs-democracy.lt.po Mismatched links: 82. Mismatched ids: 1. # text 3 | by <a href="http{+s+}://www.stallman.org/">Richard Stallman</a> by <a href=" https://www.stallman.org/ ">Richard Stallman</a> pagal <a href=" http://www.stallman.org/ ">Richard Stallman</a> 8 | Thanks to Edward Snowden's disclosures, we know that the current level of | general surveillance in society is incompatible with human rights. | {+Expecting every action to be noted down <a | href="https://www.socialcooling.com/">makes people censor and limit | themselves</a>.+} The repeated harassment and prosecution of dissidents, | sources, and journalists in the US and elsewhere provides confirmation. | We need to reduce the level of general surveillance, but how far? Where | exactly is the maximum tolerable level of surveillance, which we | must ensure is not exceeded? It is the level beyond which surveillance | starts to interfere with the functioning of democracy, in that | whistleblowers (such as Snowden) are likely to be caught. Thanks to Edward Snowden's disclosures, we know that the current level of general surveillance in society is incompatible with human rights. Expecting every action to be noted down <a href=" https://www.socialcooling.com/ ">makes people censor and limit themselves</a>. The repeated harassment and prosecution of dissidents, sources, and journalists in the US and elsewhere provides confirmation. We need to reduce the level of general surveillance, but how far? Where exactly is the maximum tolerable level of surveillance, which we must ensure is not exceeded? It is the level beyond which surveillance starts to interfere with the functioning of democracy, in that whistleblowers (such as Snowden) are likely to be caught. Dėka Edward Snowden atskleidimų, mes žinome, kad dabartinis bendro visuomenės sekimo lygis yra nesuderinamas su žmogaus teisėmis. Pasikartojantis disidentų, šaltinių ir žurnalistų JAV ir kitur gąsdinimas ir persekiojimas suteikia patvirtinimą. Mums reikia sumažinti šitą bendro sekimo lygį, bet kiek? Koks tiksliai yra maksimalus toleruotinas sekimo lygis, kurį mes privalome užtikrinti, kad nebūtų viršytas? Tai yra tas lygis, už kurio sekimas pradeda kirstis su demokratijos funkcionavimu, su kuriuo informatoriai (tokie kaip Snowden) yra tikėtina, kad bus pagauti. 9 | Faced with government secrecy, we the people depend on whistleblowers to | <a href="https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/11/reddit-tpp-ama">tell us | what the state is doing</a>. {+(We were reminded of this in 2019 as | various whistleblowers gave the public increments of <a | href="https://www.commondreams.org/views/2019/09/27/trumps-ukraine-scandal-shows-why-whistleblowers-are-so-vital-democracy">information | about Trump's attempt to shake down the president of Ukraine</a>.)+} | However, today's surveillance intimidates potential whistleblowers, which | means it is too much. To recover our democratic control over the state, | we must reduce surveillance to the point where whistleblowers know they | are safe. Faced with government secrecy, we the people depend on whistleblowers to <a href="https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/11/reddit-tpp-ama">tell us what the state is doing</a>. (We were reminded of this in 2019 as various whistleblowers gave the public increments of <a href=" https://www.commondreams.org/views/2019/09/27/trumps-ukraine-scandal-shows-why-whistleblowers-are-so-vital-democracy ">information about Trump's attempt to shake down the president of Ukraine</a>.) However, today's surveillance intimidates potential whistleblowers, which means it is too much. To recover our democratic control over the state, we must reduce surveillance to the point where whistleblowers know they are safe. Susidūrę su vyriausybės slaptumu, mes, žmonės, priklausome nuo informatorių <a href="https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/11/reddit-tpp-ama">pranešimų mums apie tai, ką valstybė daro</a>. Tačiau, šiandieninis sekimas potencialius informatorius gąsdina, o tai reiškia, kad šito yra per daug. Mūsų demokratinės valstybės kontrolės atgavimui, mes privalome sumažinti sekimą tiek, jog informatoriai žinotų, kad yra saugūs. 10 | Using free/libre software, <a | href="/philosophy/free-software-even-more-important.html">as I've | advocated [-for 30 years</a>,-] {+since 1983</a>,+} is the first step in | taking control of our digital lives, and that includes preventing | surveillance. We can't trust nonfree software; the NSA <a | href="https://web.archive.org/web/20130622044225/http://blogs.computerworlduk.com/open-enterprise/2013/06/how-can-any-company-ever-trust-microsoft-again/index.htm">uses</a> | and even <a | href="http{+s+}://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/05/nsa-gchq-encryption-codes-security">creates</a> | security weaknesses in nonfree software to invade our own computers and | routers. Free software gives us control of our own computers, but <a | href="http{+s+}://www.wired.com/opinion/2013/10/149481/">that won't | protect our privacy once we set foot on the Internet</a>. Using free/libre software, <a href="/philosophy/free-software-even-more-important.html">as I've advocated since 1983</a>, is the first step in taking control of our digital lives, and that includes preventing surveillance. We can't trust nonfree software; the NSA <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20130622044225/http://blogs.computerworlduk.com/open-enterprise/2013/06/how-can-any-company-ever-trust-microsoft-again/index.htm">uses</a> and even <a href=" https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/05/nsa-gchq-encryption-codes-security ">creates</a> security weaknesses in nonfree software to invade our own computers and routers. Free software gives us control of our own computers, but <a href=" https://www.wired.com/opinion/2013/10/149481/ ">that won't protect our privacy once we set foot on the Internet</a>. Laisvos/libre programinės įrangos naudojimas, <a href="/philosophy/free-software-even-more-important.html">kaip aš raginau 30 metų</a>, yra pirmas žingsnis perimant mūsų skaitmeninių gyvenimų valdymą ir į tai įeina sekimo prevencija. Mes negalime pasitikėti nelaisva programine įranga; NSA <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20130622044225/http://blogs.computerworlduk.com/open-enterprise/2013/06/how-can-any-company-ever-trust-microsoft-again/index.htm">naudoja</a> ir net <a href=" http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/05/nsa-gchq-encryption-codes-security ">kuria</a> saugumo nelaisvoje programinėje įrangoje silpnybes, kad įsibrautų į mūsų pačių kompiuterius ir maršrutizatorius. Laisva programinė įranga mums suteikia mūsų pačių kompiuterių kontrolę, bet <a href=" http://www.wired.com/opinion/2013/10/149481/ ">tai neapsaugos mūsų privatumo, kai įžengiame į internetą</a>. 11 | <a | href="http{+s+}://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/10/nsa-surveillance-patriot-act-author-bill">Bipartisan | legislation to “curtail the domestic surveillance powers”</a> | in the U.S. is being drawn up, but it relies on limiting the government's | use of our virtual dossiers. That won't suffice to protect whistleblowers | if “catching the whistleblower” is grounds for access | sufficient to identify him or her. We need to go further. <a href=" https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/10/nsa-surveillance-patriot-act-author-bill ">Bipartisan legislation to “curtail the domestic surveillance powers”</a> in the U.S. is being drawn up, but it relies on limiting the government's use of our virtual dossiers. That won't suffice to protect whistleblowers if “catching the whistleblower” is grounds for access sufficient to identify him or her. We need to go further. <a href=" http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/10/nsa-surveillance-patriot-act-author-bill ">Dvipartinė teisė &bdquo;nutraukti vietinio sekimo galias“</a> JAV yra kuriama, bet ji paremta mūsų virtualių asmeninių įrašų naudojimo apribojimu vyriausybei. Šito neužteks apsaugoti informatorius jei &bdquo;informatoriaus pagavimas“ yra pakankamas pagrindas gauti prieigą, pakankamą jį arba ją identifikuoti. Mums reikia žengti toliau. 13 | [-The-]{+<a href="#upperlimit">The+} Upper Limit on Surveillance in a | [-Democracy-] {+Democracy</a>+} <a href=" #upperlimit ">The Upper Limit on Surveillance in a Democracy</a> Viršutinė sekimo demokratijoje riba 14 | [-Information,-]{+<a href="#willbemisused">Information,+} Once | Collected, Will Be [-Misused-] {+Misused</a>+} <a href=" #willbemisused ">Information, Once Collected, Will Be Misused</a> Informacija, surinkus, bus netinkamai panaudota 15 | [-Robust-]{+<a href="#technical">Robust+} Protection for Privacy Must Be | [-Technical-] {+Technical</a>+} <a href=" #technical ">Robust Protection for Privacy Must Be Technical</a> Tvirta privatumo apsauga privalo būti technine 16 | [-First,-]{+<a href="#commonsense">First,+} Don't Be [-Foolish-] | {+Foolish</a>+} <a href=" #commonsense ">First, Don't Be Foolish</a> Pirma, nebūkite kvaili 17 | [-We-]{+<a href="#privacybydesign">We+} Must Design Every System for | [-Privacy-] {+Privacy</a>+} <a href=" #privacybydesign ">We Must Design Every System for Privacy</a> Mes privalome kiekvieną sistemą projektuoti privatumui 18 | [-Remedy-]{+<a href="#dispersal">Remedy+} for Collecting Data: Leaving | It [-Dispersed-] {+Dispersed</a>+} <a href=" #dispersal ">Remedy for Collecting Data: Leaving It Dispersed</a> Duomenų rinkimo ištaisymas: palikti juos išbarstytus 19 | [-Remedy-]{+<a href="#digitalcash">Remedy+} for Internet Commerce | [-Surveillance-] {+Surveillance</a>+} <a href=" #digitalcash ">Remedy for Internet Commerce Surveillance</a> Internetinės komercijos sekimo ištaisymas 20 | [-Remedy-]{+<a href="#travel">Remedy+} for Travel [-Surveillance-] | {+Surveillance</a>+} <a href=" #travel ">Remedy for Travel Surveillance</a> Keliavimo sekimo ištaisymas 21 | [-Remedy-]{+<a href="#communications">Remedy+} for Communications | [-Dossiers-] {+Dossiers</a>+} <a href=" #communications ">Remedy for Communications Dossiers</a> Komunikacinių asmeninių įrašų ištaisymas 22 | [-But-]{+<a href="#necessary">But+} Some Surveillance Is [-Necessary-] | {+Necessary</a>+} <a href=" #necessary ">But Some Surveillance Is Necessary</a> Bet kažkiek sekimo yra būtina 23 <a href=" #conclusion ">Conclusion</a> 26 | An unnamed U.S. government official ominously told journalists in 2011 | that the <a | [-href="http://www.rcfp.org/browse-media-law-resources/news-media-law/news-media-and-law-summer-2011/lessons-wye-river">U.S.-] | {+href="https://www.rcfp.org/journals/news-media-and-law-summer-2011/lessons-wye-river/">U.S.+} | would not subpoena reporters because “We know who you're talking | to.”</a> Sometimes <a | href="http{+s+}://www.theguardian.com/media/2013/sep/24/yemen-leak-sachtleben-guilty-associated-press">journalists' | phone call records are subpoenaed</a> to find this out, but Snowden has | shown us that in effect they subpoena all the phone call records of | everyone in the U.S., all the time, <a | href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/jun/06/verizon-telephone-data-court-order">from | Verizon</a> and <a | href="http{+s+}://www.marketwatch.com/story/nsa-data-mining-digs-into-networks-beyond-verizon-2013-06-07">from | other companies too</a>. An unnamed U.S. government official ominously told journalists in 2011 that the <a href=" https://www.rcfp.org/journals/news-media-and-law-summer-2011/lessons-wye-river/ ">U.S. would not subpoena reporters because “We know who you're talking to.”</a> Sometimes <a href=" https://www.theguardian.com/media/2013/sep/24/yemen-leak-sachtleben-guilty-associated-press ">journalists' phone call records are subpoenaed</a> to find this out, but Snowden has shown us that in effect they subpoena all the phone call records of everyone in the U.S., all the time, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/jun/06/verizon-telephone-data-court-order">from Verizon</a> and <a href=" https://www.marketwatch.com/story/nsa-data-mining-digs-into-networks-beyond-verizon-2013-06-07 ">from other companies too</a>. Neįvardintas JAV vyriausybės atstovas 2011 m. žurnalistams grėsmingai pranešė, kad <a href=" http://www.rcfp.org/browse-media-law-resources/news-media-law/news-media-and-law-summer-2011/lessons-wye-river ">JAV nešauks į teismą žurnalistų, nes &bdquo;Mes žinome su kuo jūs šnekate.“</a> Kartais <a href=" http://www.theguardian.com/media/2013/sep/24/yemen-leak-sachtleben-guilty-associated-press ">žurnalistų telefoninių skambučių įrašai yra užprašomi</a>, kad šitą išsiaiškinti, bet Snowden mums parodė, jog iš esmės jie užprašo kiekvieno, esančio JAV, visų telefoninių skambučių įrašų, visą laiką, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/jun/06/verizon-telephone-data-court-order">iš Verizon</a> ir <a href=" http://www.marketwatch.com/story/nsa-data-mining-digs-into-networks-beyond-verizon-2013-06-07 ">iš kitų kompanijų irgi</a>. 27 | Opposition and dissident activities need to keep secrets from states that | are willing to play dirty tricks on them. The ACLU has demonstrated the | U.S. government's <a | href="http{+s+}://www.aclu.org/files/assets/Spyfiles_2_0.pdf">systematic | practice of infiltrating peaceful dissident groups</a> on the pretext that | there might be terrorists among them. The point at which surveillance is | too much is the point at which the state can find who spoke to a known | journalist or a known dissident. Opposition and dissident activities need to keep secrets from states that are willing to play dirty tricks on them. The ACLU has demonstrated the U.S. government's <a href=" https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/Spyfiles_2_0.pdf ">systematic practice of infiltrating peaceful dissident groups</a> on the pretext that there might be terrorists among them. The point at which surveillance is too much is the point at which the state can find who spoke to a known journalist or a known dissident. Opozicinėms ir disidentinėms veikloms reikia išsaugoti paslaptis nuo valstybių, kurios linkusios su jais elgtis nešvariai. ACLU<a href="#TransNote1">1</a> pademonstravo JAV vyriausybės <a href=" http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/Spyfiles_2_0.pdf ">sistemingą įsiterpimo į taikias disidentų grupes praktiką</a>, pagal pretekstą, kad tarp jų gali būti teroristų. Riba, šalia kurios sekimo yra per daug, yra riba, prie kurios valstybė gali sužinoti kas kalbėjo su žinomu žurnalistu arba žinomu disidentu. 29 | When people recognize that the level of general surveillance is too high, | the first response is to propose limits on access to the accumulated data. | That sounds nice, but it won't fix the problem, not even slightly, even | supposing that the government obeys the rules. (The NSA has misled the | FISA court, which said it was <a | href="http{+s+}://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2013/09/nsa-violations/">unable | to effectively hold the NSA accountable</a>.) Suspicion of a crime will be | grounds for access, so once a whistleblower is accused of | “espionage,” finding the “spy” will provide an | excuse to access the accumulated material. When people recognize that the level of general surveillance is too high, the first response is to propose limits on access to the accumulated data. That sounds nice, but it won't fix the problem, not even slightly, even supposing that the government obeys the rules. (The NSA has misled the FISA court, which said it was <a href=" https://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2013/09/nsa-violations/ ">unable to effectively hold the NSA accountable</a>.) Suspicion of a crime will be grounds for access, so once a whistleblower is accused of “espionage,” finding the “spy” will provide an excuse to access the accumulated material. Kai žmonės atpažįsta, kad bendro sekimo lygis yra per didelis, pirmas atsakas yra pasiūlyti prieigos prie sukauptų duomenų ribas. Tai skamba maloniai, bet nesutvarkys tos problemos, net truputi, net priimant, kad vyriausybė paklūsta taisyklėms. (NSA suklaidino FISA teismą, kuris pranešė, kad <a href=" http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2013/09/nsa-violations/ ">negalėjo efektyviai priversti NSA būti atsakinga</a>.) Įtarimas nusikaltimu bus pagrindas prieigai, taigi, kai informatorius yra apkaltinamas &bdquo;špionažu“, to &bdquo;šnipo“ suradimas bus pasiteisinimas prieigai prie sukauptos medžiagos. 30 In practice, we can't expect state agencies even to make up excuses to satisfy the rules for using surveillance data—because US agencies already <a href=" https://theintercept.com/2018/01/09/dark-side-fbi-dea-illegal-searches-secret-evidence/ "> lie to cover up breaking the rules</a>. These rules are not seriously meant to be obeyed; rather, they are a fairy-tale we can believe if we like. 31 | In addition, the state's surveillance staff will misuse the data for | personal reasons. Some NSA agents <a | href="http{+s+}://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/24/nsa-analysts-abused-surveillance-systems">used | U.S. surveillance systems to track their lovers</a>—past, present, | or wished-for—in a practice called “LOVEINT.” The NSA | says it has caught and punished this a few times; we don't know how many | other times it wasn't caught. But these events shouldn't surprise us, | because police have long <a | href="https://web.archive.org/web/20160401102120/http://www.sweetliberty.org/issues/privacy/lein1.htm#.V_mKlYbb69I">used | their access to driver's license records to track down someone | attractive</a>, a practice known as “running a plate for a | date.” {+This practice has expanded with <a | href="https://theyarewatching.org/issues/risks-increase-once-data-shared">new | digital systems</a>. In 2016, a prosecutor was accused of forging judges' | signatures to get authorization to <a | href="https://gizmodo.com/government-officials-cant-stop-spying-on-their-crushes-1789490933"> | wiretap someone who was the object of a romantic obsession</a>. The AP | knows of <a | href="https://apnews.com/699236946e3140659fff8a2362e16f43">many other | instances in the US</a>.+} In addition, the state's surveillance staff will misuse the data for personal reasons. Some NSA agents <a href=" https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/24/nsa-analysts-abused-surveillance-systems ">used U.S. surveillance systems to track their lovers</a>—past, present, or wished-for—in a practice called “LOVEINT.” The NSA says it has caught and punished this a few times; we don't know how many other times it wasn't caught. But these events shouldn't surprise us, because police have long <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20160401102120/http://www.sweetliberty.org/issues/privacy/lein1.htm#.V_mKlYbb69I">used their access to driver's license records to track down someone attractive</a>, a practice known as “running a plate for a date.” This practice has expanded with <a href=" https://theyarewatching.org/issues/risks-increase-once-data-shared ">new digital systems</a>. In 2016, a prosecutor was accused of forging judges' signatures to get authorization to <a href=" https://gizmodo.com/government-officials-cant-stop-spying-on-their-crushes-1789490933 "> wiretap someone who was the object of a romantic obsession</a>. The AP knows of <a href=" https://apnews.com/699236946e3140659fff8a2362e16f43 ">many other instances in the US</a>. Papildomai, valstybės sekimo darbuotojai netinkamai panaudos tuos duomenis asmeniniais tikslais. Kai kurie NSA agentai <a href=" http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/24/nsa-analysts-abused-surveillance-systems ">naudojo JAV sekimo sistemas stebėti savo mylimuosius</a> – buvusius, esamus ar pageidaujamus – pagal vadinamą &bdquo;MEILĖSŽVALGYBA“ praktiką. NSA sako ji keletą kartų šitą pagavusi ir nubaudusi; mes nežinome kiek buvo kitų atvejų, kurie nebuvo pagauti. Bet šie įvykiai mūsų neturėtų stebinti, nes policija ilgai <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20160401102120/http://www.sweetliberty.org/issues/privacy/lein1.htm#.V_mKlYbb69I">naudojosi savo prieiga prie vairuotojo licencijų įrašų siekiant surasti ką nors simpatiško</a> – praktika, žinoma kaip &bdquo;valstybinio numerio paieška pasimatymui“. 32 | Surveillance data will always be used for other purposes, even if this is | prohibited. Once the data has been accumulated and the state has the | possibility of access to it, it can misuse that data in dreadful ways, as | shown by examples from <a | [-href="http://falkvinge.net/2012/03/17/collected-personal-data-will-always-be-used-against-the-citizens/">Europe</a> | and-] | {+href="https://web.archive.org/web/20220619175619/http://falkvinge.net/2012/03/17/collected-personal-data-will-always-be-used-against-the-citizens/">Europe</a>,+} | <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Japanese_American_internment">the | [-US </a>.-] {+US</a>, and most recently <a | href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/terrifying-how-a-single-line-of-computer-code-put-thousands-of-innocent-turks-in-jail-1.4495021">Turkey</a>. | (Turkey's confusion about who had really used the Bylock program only | exacerbated the basic deliberate injustice of arbitrarily punishing people | for having used it.)+} Surveillance data will always be used for other purposes, even if this is prohibited. Once the data has been accumulated and the state has the possibility of access to it, it can misuse that data in dreadful ways, as shown by examples from <a href=" https://web.archive.org/web/20220619175619/http://falkvinge.net/2012/03/17/collected-personal-data-will-always-be-used-against-the-citizens/ ">Europe</a>, <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Japanese_American_internment">the US</a>, and most recently <a href=" https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/terrifying-how-a-single-line-of-computer-code-put-thousands-of-innocent-turks-in-jail-1.4495021 ">Turkey</a>. (Turkey's confusion about who had really used the Bylock program only exacerbated the basic deliberate injustice of arbitrarily punishing people for having used it.) Sekimo duomenys visada bus panaudoti ir kitais tikslais, net jei tai yra uždrausta. Kai tik duomenys yra sukaupti ir valstybė turi galimybę prie jų prieiti, ji tuos duomenis gali pasibaisėtinais būdais panaudoti netinkamai, kaip demonstruoja pavyzdžiai iš <a href=" http://falkvinge.net/2012/03/17/collected-personal-data-will-always-be-used-against-the-citizens/ ">Europos</a> ir <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Japanese_American_internment">JAV</a>. 33 You may feel your government won't use your personal data for repression, but you can't rely on that feeling, because governments do change. As of 2021, many ostensibly democratic states are <a href=" https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2021/aug/21/beware-state-surveillance-of-your-lives-governments-can-change-afghanistan ">ruled by people with authoritarian leanings</a>, and the Taliban have taken over Afghanistan's systems of biometric identification that were set up at the instigation of the US. The UK is working on a law to <a href=" https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2021/aug/09/police-bill-not-law-order-state-control-erosion-freedom ">repress nonviolent protests that might be described as causing “serious disruption.”</a> The US could become permanently repressive in 2025, for all we know. 34 | Personal data collected by the state is also likely to be obtained by | outside crackers that break the security of the servers, even by <a | [-href="https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20150612/16334231330/second-opm-hack-revealed-even-worse-than-first.shtml">crackers-] | {+href="https://www.techdirt.com/2015/06/12/second-opm-hack-revealed-even-worse-than-first/">crackers+} | working for hostile states</a>. Personal data collected by the state is also likely to be obtained by outside crackers that break the security of the servers, even by <a href=" https://www.techdirt.com/2015/06/12/second-opm-hack-revealed-even-worse-than-first/ ">crackers working for hostile states</a>. Asmeninius duomenis, valstybės surinktus, taip pat tikėtina, kad įgys išoriniai įsilaužėliai, kurie nulaužia serverių apsaugą, net <a href=" https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20150612/16334231330/second-opm-hack-revealed-even-worse-than-first.shtml ">įsilaužėliai, dirbantys priešiškoms valstybėms</a>. 35 | Governments can easily use massive surveillance capability to <a | href="http{+s+}://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/22/world/europe/macedonia-government-is-blamed-for-wiretapping-scandal.html">subvert | democracy directly</a>. Governments can easily use massive surveillance capability to <a href=" https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/22/world/europe/macedonia-government-is-blamed-for-wiretapping-scandal.html ">subvert democracy directly</a>. Vyriausybės gali lengvai naudoti masinio sekimo gebėjimą <a href=" http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/22/world/europe/macedonia-government-is-blamed-for-wiretapping-scandal.html ">nusmukdyti demokratiją tiesiogiai</a>. 39 | However, such legal protections are precarious: as recent history shows, | they can be repealed (as in the FISA Amendments Act), suspended, or <a | href="http{+s+}://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/16/us/16nsa.html">ignored</a>. However, such legal protections are precarious: as recent history shows, they can be repealed (as in the FISA Amendments Act), suspended, or <a href=" https://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/16/us/16nsa.html ">ignored</a>. Tačiau, tokios teisinės apsaugos yra nepatikimos: pagal neseną istoriją, jos gali būti atšauktos (kaip pagal FISA pataisų aktą), atidėtos arba <a href=" http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/16/us/16nsa.html ">ignoruojamos</a>. 46 | Protect your friends' and acquaintances' privacy, too. <a | href="http{+s+}://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/05/21/in-cybersecurity-sometimes-the-weakest-link-is-a-family-member/">Don't | give out their personal information</a> except how to contact them, and | never give any web site your list of email or phone contacts. Don't tell | a company such as Facebook anything about your friends that they might not | wish to publish in a newspaper. Better yet, don't be used by Facebook at | all. Reject communication systems that require users to give their real | names, even if you are [-going-] {+happy+} to [-give-] {+divulge+} yours, | since they pressure other people to surrender their privacy. Protect your friends' and acquaintances' privacy, too. <a href=" https://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/05/21/in-cybersecurity-sometimes-the-weakest-link-is-a-family-member/ ">Don't give out their personal information</a> except how to contact them, and never give any web site your list of email or phone contacts. Don't tell a company such as Facebook anything about your friends that they might not wish to publish in a newspaper. Better yet, don't be used by Facebook at all. Reject communication systems that require users to give their real names, even if you are happy to divulge yours, since they pressure other people to surrender their privacy. Saugokite savo draugų ir kolegų privatumą taip pat. <a href=" http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/05/21/in-cybersecurity-sometimes-the-weakest-link-is-a-family-member/ ">Neatiduokite jų asmeninės informacijos</a>, išskyrus kaip su jais susisiekti, ir niekada jokiai svetainei neduokite savo el. pašto ar telefono kontaktų sąrašo. Nesakykite kompanijai, tokiai kaip Facebook, apie savo draugus nieko tokio, ko jie gali nenorėti paviešinti laikraštyje. Dar geriau, visiškai nebūkite Facebook naudojami. Atmeskite komunikacijos sistemas, kurios iš naudotojų reikalauja pateikti jų tikrus vardus, net jei jūs ketinate pateikti savąjį, kadangi jos spaudžia kitus žmones atsisakyti savo privatumo. 51 | We need to design such privacy into all our digital [-systems.-] | {+systems [<a href="#ambientprivacy">1</a>].+} We need to design such privacy into all our digital systems [<a href=" #ambientprivacy ">1</a>]. Mums reikia projektuoti tokį privatumą visose mūsų skaitmeninėse sistemose. 53 | One way to make monitoring safe for privacy is to [-<a | name="dispersal">keep-] {+keep+} the data dispersed and inconvenient to | [-access</a>.-] {+access.+} Old-fashioned security cameras were no threat | to privacy(<a href="#privatespace">*</a>). The recording was stored on | the premises, and kept for a few weeks at most. Because of the | inconvenience of accessing these recordings, it was never done massively; | they were accessed only in the places where someone reported a crime. It | would not be feasible to physically collect millions of tapes every day | and watch them or copy them. One way to make monitoring safe for privacy is to keep the data dispersed and inconvenient to access. Old-fashioned security cameras were no threat to privacy(<a href="#privatespace">*</a>). The recording was stored on the premises, and kept for a few weeks at most. Because of the inconvenience of accessing these recordings, it was never done massively; they were accessed only in the places where someone reported a crime. It would not be feasible to physically collect millions of tapes every day and watch them or copy them. Vienas būdas padaryti stebėjimą saugiu privatumo atžvilgiu yra <a name=" dispersal ">išlaikyti duomenis išbarstytus ir prieigai nepatogius</a>. Seno stiliaus saugumo kameros nekėlė privatumui jokio pavojaus(<a href="#privatespace">*</a>). Įrašas buvo saugomas valdoje ir laikytas ilgiausiai kelias savaites. Dėl prieigos prie šių įrašų nepatogumo, tai niekada nebuvo daroma masiškai; prie jų būdavo prieinama tik vietose, kuriose kas nors pranešė apie nusikaltimą. Nebūtų įmanoma fiziškai surinkti milijonus kasečių kiekvieną dieną ir jas peržiūrėti arba nukopijuoti. 54 | Nowadays, security cameras have become surveillance cameras: they are | connected to the Internet so recordings can be collected in a data center | and saved forever. {+In Detroit, the cops pressure businesses to give | them <a | href="https://eu.detroitnews.com/story/news/local/detroit-city/2018/01/23/detroit-green-light/109524794/">unlimited | access to their surveillance cameras</a> so that they can look through | them at any and all times.+} This is already dangerous, but it is going | to get worse. Advances in [-face recognition-] {+<a | href="#facial-recognition">facial recognition</a>+} may bring the day | when suspected journalists can be tracked on the street all the time to | see who they talk with. Nowadays, security cameras have become surveillance cameras: they are connected to the Internet so recordings can be collected in a data center and saved forever. In Detroit, the cops pressure businesses to give them <a href=" https://eu.detroitnews.com/story/news/local/detroit-city/2018/01/23/detroit-green-light/109524794/ ">unlimited access to their surveillance cameras</a> so that they can look through them at any and all times. This is already dangerous, but it is going to get worse. Advances in <a href=" #facial-recognition ">facial recognition</a> may bring the day when suspected journalists can be tracked on the street all the time to see who they talk with. Šiomis dienomis, saugumo kameros tapo sekimo kameromis: jos yra prijungtos prie interneto, taigi, įrašai gali būti surinkti į duomenų centrą ir išsaugoti amžinai. Tai jau yra pavojinga, bet bus dar blogiau. Su veido atpažinimo progresu galime sulaukti dienos, kada įtariamus žurnalistus, kad pamatyti su kuo jie šneka, bus galima stebėti gatvėje visą laiką. 57 Also consider reading “<a href=" https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/apr/03/facebook-abusing-data-law-privacy-big-tech-surveillance ">A radical proposal to keep your personal data safe</a>,” published in <cite>The Guardian</cite> in April 2018. 60 | The NSA, through PRISM, has <a | [-href="https://www.commondreams.org/headline/2013/08/23-2">gotten-] | {+href="https://www.commondreams.org/news/2013/08/23/latest-docs-show-financial-ties-between-nsa-and-internet-companies">gotten+} | into the databases of many large Internet corporations</a>. AT&T has | saved all its phone call records since 1987 and <a | href="http{+s+}://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/02/us/drug-agents-use-vast-phone-trove-eclipsing-nsas.html?_r=0">makes | them available to the DEA</a> to search on request. Strictly speaking, | the U.S. government does not possess that data, but in practical terms it | may as well possess it. {+Some companies are praised for <a | href="https://www.eff.org/who-has-your-back-government-data-requests-2015">resisting | government data requests to the limited extent they can</a>, but that can | only partly compensate for the harm they do to by collecting that data in | the first place. In addition, many of those companies misuse the data | directly or provide it to data brokers.+} The NSA, through PRISM, has <a href=" https://www.commondreams.org/news/2013/08/23/latest-docs-show-financial-ties-between-nsa-and-internet-companies ">gotten into the databases of many large Internet corporations</a>. AT&T has saved all its phone call records since 1987 and <a href=" https://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/02/us/drug-agents-use-vast-phone-trove-eclipsing-nsas.html?_r=0 ">makes them available to the DEA</a> to search on request. Strictly speaking, the U.S. government does not possess that data, but in practical terms it may as well possess it. Some companies are praised for <a href=" https://www.eff.org/who-has-your-back-government-data-requests-2015 ">resisting government data requests to the limited extent they can</a>, but that can only partly compensate for the harm they do to by collecting that data in the first place. In addition, many of those companies misuse the data directly or provide it to data brokers. NSA, per PRISM, <a href=" https://www.commondreams.org/headline/2013/08/23-2 ">pateko į daugelio didelių interneto korporacijų duomenų bazes</a>. AT&T išsaugojo visus per ją nuo 1987 m. atliktus telefoninių skambučių įrašus ir <a href=" http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/02/us/drug-agents-use-vast-phone-trove-eclipsing-nsas.html?_r=0 ">padarė juos prieinamus DEA</a> paieškai pagal užklausimą. Tiesą sakant, JAV vyriausybė neturi tų duomenų, bet praktine prasme galima laikyti, kad ji juos turi. 63 | We could correct both problems by adopting a system of anonymous | payments—anonymous for the payer, that is. (We don't want {+to | help+} the payee [-to-] dodge taxes.) <a | href="http{+s+}://www.wired.com/opinion/2013/05/lets-cut-through-the-bitcoin-hype/">Bitcoin | is not anonymous</a>, though there are efforts to develop ways to pay | anonymously with Bitcoin. However, technology for <a | href="http{+s+}://www.wired.com/wired/archive/2.12/emoney_pr.html">digital | cash was first developed in the 1980s</a>; {+the GNU software for doing | this is called <a href="https://taler.net/">GNU Taler</a>. Now+} we | need only suitable business arrangements, and for the state not to | obstruct them. We could correct both problems by adopting a system of anonymous payments—anonymous for the payer, that is. (We don't want to help the payee dodge taxes.) <a href=" https://www.wired.com/opinion/2013/05/lets-cut-through-the-bitcoin-hype/ ">Bitcoin is not anonymous</a>, though there are efforts to develop ways to pay anonymously with Bitcoin. However, technology for <a href=" https://www.wired.com/wired/archive/2.12/emoney_pr.html ">digital cash was first developed in the 1980s</a>; the GNU software for doing this is called <a href=" https://taler.net/ ">GNU Taler</a>. Now we need only suitable business arrangements, and for the state not to obstruct them. Mes galėtume pakoreguoti abi problemas priimdami anoniminių mokėjimų sistemą – tai yra, anoniminė mokėtojui. (Mes nenorime, kad pardavėjas vengtų mokesčių.) <a href=" http://www.wired.com/opinion/2013/05/lets-cut-through-the-bitcoin-hype/ ">Bitcoin nėra anoniminis</a>, nors yra pastangų sukurti būdus mokėti su Bitcoin anonimiškai. Tačiau, technologija <a href=" http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/2.12/emoney_pr.html ">skaitmeniniams gryniesiems pirma buvo sukurta 1980–1990 m. laikotarpyje</a>; mums reikia tik tinkamų verslui planų ir, kad valstybė jiems nekliudytų. 64 Another possible method for anonymous payments would use <a href=" /philosophy/phone-anonymous-payment.html ">prepaid phone cards</a>. It is less convenient, but very easy to implement. 67 | We must convert digital toll collection to anonymous payment (using | digital cash, for instance). License-plate recognition systems {+<a | href="https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2018/11/eff-and-muckrock-release-records-and-data-200-law-enforcement-agencies-automated">+} | recognize all {+cars'+} license [-plates,-] {+plates</a>,+} and the <a | href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/whos_watching_you/8064333.stm">data | can be kept indefinitely</a>; they should be required by law to notice and | record only those license numbers that are on a list of cars sought by | court orders. A less secure alternative would record all cars locally but | only for a few days, and not make the full data available over the | Internet; access to the data should be limited to searching for a list of | court-ordered license-numbers. We must convert digital toll collection to anonymous payment (using digital cash, for instance). License-plate recognition systems <a href=" https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2018/11/eff-and-muckrock-release-records-and-data-200-law-enforcement-agencies-automated "> recognize all cars' license plates</a>, and the <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/whos_watching_you/8064333.stm">data can be kept indefinitely</a>; they should be required by law to notice and record only those license numbers that are on a list of cars sought by court orders. A less secure alternative would record all cars locally but only for a few days, and not make the full data available over the Internet; access to the data should be limited to searching for a list of court-ordered license-numbers. Mes privalome skaitmeninės rinkliavos surinkimą paversti anoniminiu mokėjimu (pavyzdžiui, naudojant skaitmeninius grynuosius). Valstybinių numerių atpažinimo sistemos atpažįsta visus valstybinius numerius ir šie <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/whos_watching_you/8064333.stm">duomenys gali būti laikomi neapibrėžtą laiką</a>; iš jų turėtų būti įstatymiškai reikalaujama pastebėti ir įrašyti tik tuos valstybinius numerius, kurie yra teismo sprendimais paieškomų automobilių sąraše. Mažiau saugi alternatyva vietoje įrašytų visus automobilius, bet tik kelioms dienoms ir pilnų duomenų nepadarytų prieinamais internetu; prieiga prie šių duomenų turėtų būti apribota valstybinių numerių pagal teismo sprendimus sąrašo ieškojimu. 68 | The U.S. “no-fly” list must be abolished because it is <a | [-href="https://www.aclu.org/blog/national-security-technology-and-liberty-racial-justice/victory-federal-court-recognizes">punishment-] | {+href="https://www.aclu.org/news/national-security/victory-federal-court-recognizes-constitutional">punishment+} | without trial</a>. The U.S. “no-fly” list must be abolished because it is <a href=" https://www.aclu.org/news/national-security/victory-federal-court-recognizes-constitutional ">punishment without trial</a>. JAV &bdquo;neskraidymo“ sąrašo turi būti atsikratyta, nes tai yra <a href=" https://www.aclu.org/blog/national-security-technology-and-liberty-racial-justice/victory-federal-court-recognizes ">bausmė be teismo</a>. 74 | Internet service providers and telephone companies keep extensive data on | their users' contacts (browsing, phone calls, etc). With mobile phones, | they also <a | [-href="http://www.zeit.de/digital/datenschutz/2011-03/data-protection-malte-spitz">record-] | {+href="https://web.archive.org/web/20210312235125/http://www.zeit.de/digital/datenschutz/2011-03/data-protection-malte-spitz">record+} | the user's physical location</a>. They keep these dossiers for a long | time: over 30 years, in the case of AT&T. Soon they will even <a | href="http{+s+}://www.wired.com/opinion/2013/10/the-trojan-horse-of-the-latest-iphone-with-the-m7-coprocessor-we-all-become-qs-activity-trackers/">record | the user's body activities</a>. It appears that the <a | [-href="https://www.aclu.org/blog/national-security-technology-and-liberty/it-sure-sounds-nsa-tracking-your-location">NSA-] | {+href="https://www.aclu.org/news/national-security/it-sure-sounds-nsa-tracking-our-locations">NSA+} | collects cell phone location data</a> in bulk. Internet service providers and telephone companies keep extensive data on their users' contacts (browsing, phone calls, etc). With mobile phones, they also <a href=" https://web.archive.org/web/20210312235125/http://www.zeit.de/digital/datenschutz/2011-03/data-protection-malte-spitz ">record the user's physical location</a>. They keep these dossiers for a long time: over 30 years, in the case of AT&T. Soon they will even <a href=" https://www.wired.com/opinion/2013/10/the-trojan-horse-of-the-latest-iphone-with-the-m7-coprocessor-we-all-become-qs-activity-trackers/ ">record the user's body activities</a>. It appears that the <a href=" https://www.aclu.org/news/national-security/it-sure-sounds-nsa-tracking-our-locations ">NSA collects cell phone location data</a> in bulk. Prieigos prie interneto tiekėjai ir telefoninio ryšio kompanijos laiko išsamius savo naudotojų kontaktų duomenis (naršymas, telefoniniai skambučiai ir t. t.). Su mobiliaisiais telefonais, jie taip pat <a href=" http://www.zeit.de/digital/datenschutz/2011-03/data-protection-malte-spitz ">įrašo naudotojo fizinę buvimo vietą</a>. Jie šiuos asmeninius įrašus laiko ilgą laiką: AT&T atveju, virš 30 metų. Greitai jie net <a href=" http://www.wired.com/opinion/2013/10/the-trojan-horse-of-the-latest-iphone-with-the-m7-coprocessor-we-all-become-qs-activity-trackers/ ">įrašinės naudotojo kūno procesus</a>. Panašu, kad <a href=" https://www.aclu.org/blog/national-security-technology-and-liberty/it-sure-sounds-nsa-tracking-your-location ">NSA korinio ryšio telefonų vietos duomenis renka</a> masiškai. 76 | This solution is not entirely satisfactory, because it won't physically | stop the government from collecting all the information immediately as it | is generated—which is what the <a | href="http{+s+}://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jun/06/nsa-phone-records-verizon-court-order">U.S. | does with some or all phone companies</a>. We would have to rely on | prohibiting that by law. However, that would be better than the current | situation, where the relevant law (the PAT RIOT Act) does not clearly | prohibit the practice. In addition, if the government did resume this | sort of surveillance, it would not get data about everyone's phone calls | made prior to that time. This solution is not entirely satisfactory, because it won't physically stop the government from collecting all the information immediately as it is generated—which is what the <a href=" https://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jun/06/nsa-phone-records-verizon-court-order ">U.S. does with some or all phone companies</a>. We would have to rely on prohibiting that by law. However, that would be better than the current situation, where the relevant law (the PAT RIOT Act) does not clearly prohibit the practice. In addition, if the government did resume this sort of surveillance, it would not get data about everyone's phone calls made prior to that time. Šis sprendimas nėra visiškai patenkinantis, nes jis fiziškai nesustabdys vyriausybės nuo visos informacijos, iškarto kai ji yra sugeneruojama, rinkimo – tai, ką <a href=" http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jun/06/nsa-phone-records-verizon-court-order ">JAV daro su kai kuriomis arba visomis telefoninio ryšio kompanijomis</a>. Mes turėtume pasikliauti to įstatymišku uždraudimu. Tačiau, tai būtų geriau, nei dabartinė situacija, kai aktualus įstatymas (PATAPŠNOTO MAIŠTO<a href="#TransNote2">2</a> aktas) šitos praktikos aiškiai neuždraudžia. Papildomai, jei vyriausybė vėl pradėtų atlikti tokio tipo sekimą, ji negautų duomenų apie kiekvieno telefoninius skambučius, atliktus iki to laiko. 80 | Individuals with special state-granted power, such as police, forfeit | their right to privacy and must be monitored. (In fact, police have their | own jargon term for perjury, “<a | href="https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Police_perjury&oldid=552608302">testilying</a>,” | since they do it so frequently, particularly about protesters and <a | href="https://web.archive.org/web/20131025014556/http://photographyisnotacrime.com/2013/10/23/jeff-gray-arrested-recording-cops-days-becoming-pinac-partner/"> | photographers</a>.) One city in California that required police to wear | video cameras all the time found <a | href="http{+s+}://www.motherjones.com/kevin-drum/2013/08/ubiquitous-surveillance-police-edition">their | use of force fell by 60%</a>. The ACLU is in favor of this. Individuals with special state-granted power, such as police, forfeit their right to privacy and must be monitored. (In fact, police have their own jargon term for perjury, “<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Police_perjury&oldid=552608302">testilying</a>,” since they do it so frequently, particularly about protesters and <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20131025014556/http://photographyisnotacrime.com/2013/10/23/jeff-gray-arrested-recording-cops-days-becoming-pinac-partner/"> photographers</a>.) One city in California that required police to wear video cameras all the time found <a href=" https://www.motherjones.com/kevin-drum/2013/08/ubiquitous-surveillance-police-edition ">their use of force fell by 60%</a>. The ACLU is in favor of this. Individai, turintys specialią, valstybės suteiktą galią, tokie kaip policija, netenka savo teisės į privatumą ir privalo būti stebimi. (Iš tikrųjų, policija turi savo pačios žargoninį priesaikos sulaužymo terminą – &bdquo;<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Police_perjury&oldid=552608302">liudijimasmelavimas</a>“, kadangi ji šitą daro taip dažnai, ypatingai su protestuotojais ir <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20131025014556/http://photographyisnotacrime.com/2013/10/23/jeff-gray-arrested-recording-cops-days-becoming-pinac-partner/">fotografais</a>.) Vienas Kalifornijos miestas, kuriame policijai reikėjo visą laiką dėvėti video kameras, atrado, kad <a href=" http://www.motherjones.com/kevin-drum/2013/08/ubiquitous-surveillance-police-edition ">jos jėgos panaudojimas sumažėjo 60 %</a>. ACLU šitam teikia pirmenybę. 81 | <a | href="https://web.archive.org/web/20171019220057/http://action.citizen.org/p/dia/action3/common/public/?action_KEY=12266">Corporations | are not people, and not entitled to human rights</a>. It is legitimate to | require businesses to publish the details of processes that might cause | chemical, biological, nuclear, fiscal, computational (e.g., <a | href="http{+s+}://DefectiveByDesign.org">DRM</a>) or political (e.g., | lobbying) hazards to society, to whatever level is needed for public | well-being. The danger of these operations (consider the BP oil spill, | the Fukushima meltdowns, and the 2008 fiscal crisis) dwarfs that of | terrorism. <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20171019220057/http://action.citizen.org/p/dia/action3/common/public/?action_KEY=12266">Corporations are not people, and not entitled to human rights</a>. It is legitimate to require businesses to publish the details of processes that might cause chemical, biological, nuclear, fiscal, computational (e.g., <a href=" https://DefectiveByDesign.org ">DRM</a>) or political (e.g., lobbying) hazards to society, to whatever level is needed for public well-being. The danger of these operations (consider the BP oil spill, the Fukushima meltdowns, and the 2008 fiscal crisis) dwarfs that of terrorism. <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20171019220057/http://action.citizen.org/p/dia/action3/common/public/?action_KEY=12266">Korporacijos nėra žmonės ir žmogaus teisės netaikytinos</a>. Teisėta iš įmonių reikalauti paviešinti detales procesų, kurie gali sukelti cheminių, biologinių, branduolinių, fiskalinių, skaičiuojamųjų (pvz., <a href=" http://DefectiveByDesign.org ">DRM</a>) ar politinių (pvz., užkulisinė veikla) pavojų visuomenei, iki bet kokio viešajai gerovei reikalingo lygio. Šių operacijų pavojus (apsvarstykite BP naftos išliejimą, išsilydimus Fukušimoje ir 2008 m. fiskalinę krizę) pranoksta terorizmą. 88 The condition of not being monitored has been referred to as <a href=" https://idlewords.com/2019/06/the_new_wilderness.htm ">ambient privacy</a>. 89 In the 2020s, facial recognition deepens the danger of surveillance cameras. China already identifies people by their faces so as to punish them, and <a href=" https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2022/sep/05/iran-government-facial-recognition-technology-hijab-law-crackdown ">Iran is planning to use it to punish women who violate religion-imposed dress codes</a>. 93 TODO: submitting -> contributing. || No change detected. The change might only be in amounts of spaces. Please see the <a href="/server/standards/README.translations.html">Translations README</a> for information on coordinating and contributing translations of this article. Mes dirbame sunkiai ir labai stengiamės, kad pateiktume tikslius, geros kokybės vertimus. Tačiau mes nesame išimtys netobulumui. Prašome siųskite savo komentarus ir bendrus pasiūlymus šia prasme į <a href=" mailto:web-translators@gnu.org "><web-translators@gnu.org></a>. Mūsų tinklapių vertimų koordinavimo ir pateikimo informaciją pamatykite <a href="/server/standards/README.translations.html">Vertimų PERSKAITYKITEMANE</a>. ...; http://www.gnu.org/savannah-checkouts/gnu/gnun/reports/lt/philosophy/surveillance-vs-democracy.html - [detail] - [similar]

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