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- malware-mobiles.pt-br.po
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- malware-mobiles.pt-br.po Mismatched links: 110. Mismatched ids: 0. # text 13 Tracking users' location is a consequence of how the cellular network operates: it needs to know which cell towers the phone is near, so it can communicate with the phone via a nearby tower. That gives the network location data which it saves for months or years. See <a href=" #phone-communications ">below</a>. 16 Many phone apps are malicious, too. See <a href=" #TOC ">below</a>. 19 This section describes a malicious characteristic of mobile phone networks: location tracking. The phone network <a href=" https://ssd.eff.org/playlist/privacy-breakdown-mobile-phones "> tracks the movements of each phone</a>. A rede telefônica <a href=" https://ssd.eff.org/pt-br/module/o-problema-com-os-celulares "> rastreia os movimentos de cada telefone</a>. 22 US states that ban abortion talk about making it a crime to go to another state to get an abortion. They could <a href=" https://www.cnn.com/2022/08/29/tech/wireless-carriers-locations-fcc/index.html "> use various forms of location tracking, including the network, to prosecute abortion-seekers</a>. The state could subpoena the data, so that the network's “privacy” policy would be irrelevant. 26 Network location tracking is used, among other techniques, for <a href=" https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/location-based-advertising-has-starbucks-coupon-finally-john-craig "> targeted advertising</a>. 41 Many popular mobile games include a random-reward system called <a href=" /proprietary/proprietary-addictions.html#gacha "> <i>gacha</i></a> which is especially effective on children. One variant of gacha was declared illegal in Japan in 2012, but the other variants are still <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/olliebarder/2016/04/04/japanese-mobile-gaming-still-cant-shake-off-the-spectre-of-exploitation/"> luring players into compulsively spending</a> inordinate amounts of money on virtual toys. Muitos jogos populares para celular incluem um sistema de recompensa aleatório chamado <a href=" #gacha "><i>gacha</i></a>, que é especialmente eficaz para crianças. Uma variante do gacha foi declarada ilegal no Japão em 2012, mas as outras variantes ainda estão <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/olliebarder/2016/04/04/japanese-mobile-gaming-still-cant-shake-off-the-spectre-of-exploitation/"> atraindo jogadores para compulsivamente gastar</a> quantias excessivas de dinheiro em brinquedos virtuais. 44 The back door <a class="not-a-duplicate" href=" https://www.osnews.com/story/27416/the-second-operating-system-hiding-in-every-mobile-phone/ "> may take the form of bugs that have gone 20 years unfixed</a>. The choice to leave the security holes in place is morally equivalent to writing a back door. O <em>backdoor</em> <a class="not-a-duplicate" href=" http://www.osnews.com/story/27416/The_second_operating_system_hiding_in_every_mobile_phone "> pode assumir a forma de bugs que não foram corrigidos por 20 anos</a>. A escolha de deixar as brechas de segurança no lugar é moralmente equivalente a escrever uma <em>backdoor</em>. 57 <a href=" https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/dec/18/chinese-android-phones-coolpad-hacker-backdoor "> A Chinese version of Android has a universal back door</a>. Nearly all models of mobile phones have a <a href="#universal-back-door-phone-modem"> universal back door in the modem chip</a>. So why did Coolpad bother to introduce another? Because this one is controlled by Coolpad. <a href=" http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/dec/18/chinese-android-phones-coolpad-hacker-backdoor "> Uma versão chinesa do Android tem um <em>backdoor</em> universal</a>. Quase todos os modelos de telefones celulares têm um <a href="#universal-back-door-phone-modem"> <em>backdoor</em> universal no chip do modem</a>. Então, por que o Coolpad se deu ao trabalho de apresentar outro? Porque este é controlado pela Coolpad. 64 The Netflix Android app <a href=" https://torrentfreak.com/netflix-cracks-down-on-vpn-and-proxy-pirates-150103/ "> forces the use of Google DNS</a>. This is one of the methods that Netflix uses to enforce the geolocation restrictions dictated by the movie studios. O aplicativo Netflix para Android <a href=" http://torrentfreak.com/netflix-cracks-down-on-vpn-and-proxy-pirates-150103/ "> força o uso do DNS do Google</a>. Este é um dos métodos que a Netflix usa para fazer cumprir as restrições de geolocalização ditadas pelos estúdios de cinema. 67 A security researcher found that the iOS in-app browser of TikTok <a href=" https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2022/aug/24/tiktok-can-track-users-every-tap-as-they-visit-other-sites-through-ios-app-new-research-shows "> injects keylogger-like JavaScript code into outside web pages</a>. This code has the ability to track all users' activities, and to retrieve any personal data that is entered on the pages. We have no way of verifying TikTok's claim that the keylogger-like code only serves purely technical functions. Some of the accessed data could well be saved to the company's servers, and even sent to third parties. This would open the door to extensive surveillance, including by the Chinese government (to which TikTok has indirect ties). There is also a risk that the data would be stolen by crackers, and used to launch malware attacks. 68 The iOS in-app browsers of Instagram and Facebook behave essentially the same way as TikTok's. The main difference is that Instagram and Facebook allow users to access third-party sites with their default browser, whereas <a href=" https://web.archive.org/web/20221201065621/https://www.reddit.com/r/Tiktokhelp/comments/jlep5d/how_do_i_make_urls_open_in_my_browser_instead_of/ "> TikTok makes it nearly impossible</a>. 73 Siri, Alexa, and all the other voice-control systems can be <a href=" https://www.fastcompany.com/90139019/a-simple-design-flaw-makes-it-astoundingly-easy-to-hack-siri-and-alexa "> hijacked by programs that play commands in ultrasound that humans can't hear</a>. Siri, Alexa e todos os outros sistemas de controle por voz podem ser <a href=" https://www.fastcodesign.com/90139019/a-simple-design-flaw-makes-it-astoundingly-easy-to-hack-siri-and-alexa "> sequestrados por programas que reproduzem comandos de ultrassom que os humanos não conseguem ouvir</a>. 75 Many Android devices <a href=" https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2017/04/wide-range-of-android-phones-vulnerable-to-device-hijacks-over-wi-fi/ "> can be hijacked through their Wi-Fi chips</a> because of a bug in Broadcom's nonfree firmware. Muitos dispositivos Android <a href=" https://arstechnica.com/security/2017/04/wide-range-of-android-phones-vulnerable-to-device-hijacks-over-wi-fi/ "> podem ser sequestrados por meio de seus chips Wi-Fi</a> por causa de um bug no firmware não livre da Broadcom. 76 The CIA exploited existing vulnerabilities in “smart” TVs and phones to design a malware that <a href=" https://www.independent.co.uk/tech/wikileaks-vault-7-android-iphone-cia-phones-handsets-tv-smart-julian-assange-a7616651.html "> spies through their microphones and cameras while making them appear to be turned off</a>. Since the spyware sniffs signals, it bypasses encryption. A CIA explorou as vulnerabilidades existentes em TVs e telefones “inteligentes” para projetar um <em>malware</em> que <a href=" https://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-and-tech/news/wikileaks-vault-7-android-iphone-cia-phones-handsets-tv-smart-julian-assange-a7616651.html "> espia através de seus microfones e câmeras enquanto os faz parecer desligados</a>. Como o <i lang="en">spyware</i> detecta sinais, ignora a criptografia. 82 The “smart” toys My Friend Cayla and i-Que can be <a href=" https://www.forbrukerradet.no/siste-nytt/connected-toys-violate-consumer-laws/ ">remotely controlled with a mobile phone</a>; physical access is not necessary. This would enable crackers to listen in on a child's conversations, and even speak into the toys themselves. Os brinquedos “inteligentes” My Friend Cayla e i-Que podem ser <a href=" https://www.forbrukerradet.no/siste-nytt/connected-toys-violate-consumer-laws ">controlados remotamente com um telefone celular</a>; o acesso físico não é necessário. Isso permitiria aos <em>crackers</em> ouvir as conversas de uma criança e até falar para os próprios brinquedos. 85 A half-blind security critique of a tracking app: it found that <a href=" https://www.consumerreports.org/mobile-security-software/glow-pregnancy-app-exposed-women-to-privacy-threats-a1100919965/ "> blatant flaws allowed anyone to snoop on a user's personal data</a>. The critique fails entirely to express concern that the app sends the personal data to a server, where the <em>developer</em> gets it all. This “service” is for suckers! Uma crítica de segurança meio cega a um aplicativo de rastreamento: descobriu-se que <a href=" http://www.consumerreports.org/mobile-security-software/glow-pregnancy-app-exposed-women-to-privacy-threats/ "> falhas flagrantes permitiram a qualquer um bisbilhotar os dados pessoais de um usuário</a>. A critica falha inteiramente em expressar preocupação de que o aplicativo envie os dados pessoais para um servidor, no qual o <em>desenvolvedor</em> obtém tudo. Este “serviço” é para otários! 87 A bug in a proprietary ASN.1 library, used in cell phone towers as well as cell phones and routers, <a href=" https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2016/07/software-flaw-puts-mobile-phones-and-networks-at-risk-of-complete-takeover/ ">allows taking control of those systems</a>. Um bug em uma biblioteca privativa ASN.1, usada em torres de telefones celulares e também em telefones celulares e roteadores, <a href=" http://arstechnica.com/security/2016/07/software-flaw-puts-mobile-phones-and-networks-at-risk-of-complete-takeover ">permite assumir o controle desses sistemas</a>. 88 Samsung's “Smart Home” has a big security hole; <a href=" https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2016/05/samsung-smart-home-flaws-lets-hackers-make-keys-to-front-door/ "> unauthorized people can remotely control it</a>. O “Smart Home” da Samsung tem uma grande falha de segurança; <a href=" http://arstechnica.com/security/2016/05/samsung-smart-home-flaws-lets-hackers-make-keys-to-front-door/ "> pessoas não autorizadas podem controlá-lo remotamente</a>. 91 Many proprietary payment apps <a href=" https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-03-10/many-mobile-payments-startups-aren-t-properly-securing-user-data ">transmit personal data in an insecure way</a>. However, the worse aspect of these apps is that <a href="/philosophy/surveillance-vs-democracy.html">payment is not anonymous</a>. Muitos aplicativos privativos de pagamento <a href=" http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-03-10/many-mobile-payments-startups-aren-t-properly-securing-user-data "> transmitem dados pessoais de forma insegura</a>. No entanto, o pior aspecto desses aplicativos é que <a href="/philosophy/surveillance-vs-democracy.html">o pagamento não é anônimo</a>. 92 <a href=" https://phys.org/news/2015-05-app-vulnerability-threatens-millions-users.html "> Many smartphone apps use insecure authentication methods when storing your personal data on remote servers</a>. This leaves personal information like email addresses, passwords, and health information vulnerable. Because many of these apps are proprietary it makes it hard to impossible to know which apps are at risk. <a href=" http://phys.org/news/2015-05-app-vulnerability-threatens-millions-users.html "> Muitos aplicativos de smartphone usam métodos de autenticação inseguros ao armazenar seus dados pessoais em servidores remotos</a>. Isso deixa informações pessoais como endereços de e-mail, senhas e informações de saúde vulneráveis. Como muitos desses aplicativos são privativos, é difícil ou impossível saber quais aplicativos estão em risco. 93 An app to prevent “identity theft” (access to personal data) by storing users' data on a special server <a href=" https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2014/05/id-theft-protector-lifelock-deletes-user-data-over-concerns-that-app-isnt-safe/ ">was deactivated by its developer</a> which had discovered a security flaw. Um aplicativo para evitar “roubo de identidade” (acesso a dados pessoais) armazenando os dados dos usuários em um servidor especial <a href=" http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2014/05/id-theft-protector-lifelock-deletes-user-data-over-concerns-that-app-isnt-safe/ ">foi desativado por seu desenvolvedor</a>, que descobriu uma falha de segurança. 95 The <a href=" https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2014/02/crypto-weaknesses-in-whatsapp-the-kind-of-stuff-the-nsa-would-love/ ">insecurity of WhatsApp</a> makes eavesdropping a snap. A <a href=" http://arstechnica.com/security/2014/02/crypto-weaknesses-in-whatsapp-the-kind-of-stuff-the-nsa-would-love/ ">insegurança do WhatsApp</a> torna a escuta rápida. 96 <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20180816030205/http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/privacy-scandal-nsa-can-spy-on-smart-phone-data-a-920971.html"> The NSA can tap data in smart phones, including iPhones, Android, and BlackBerry</a>. While there is not much detail here, it seems that this does not operate via the universal back door that we know nearly all portable phones have. It may involve exploiting various bugs. There are <a href=" https://www.osnews.com/story/27416/the-second-operating-system-hiding-in-every-mobile-phone/ "> lots of bugs in the phones' radio software</a>. <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20180816030205/http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/privacy-scandal-nsa-can-spy-on-smart-phone-data-a-920971.html"> A NSA pode interceptar dados em smartphones, incluindo iPhones, Android e BlackBerry</a>. Embora não haja muitos detalhes aqui, parece que isso não funciona através do <em>backdoor</em> universal que sabemos que quase todos os telefones portáteis possuem. Pode envolver a exploração de vários bugs. Existem <a href=" http://www.osnews.com/story/27416/The_second_operating_system_hiding_in_every_mobile_phone "> muitos bugs no software de rádio dos telefones</a>. 99 <a href=" https://web.archive.org/web/20231011121908/https://www.makeuseof.com/how-to-remove-ads-on-samsung/ ">Samsung's Push Service proprietary app</a> sends notifications to the user's phone about “updates” in Samsung apps, including the Gaming Hub, but these updates only sometimes have to do with a new version of the apps. Many times, the notifications from Gaming Hub are simply ads for games that they think the user should install based on the data collected from the user. Most importantly, <a href=" https://getfastanswer.com/3486/how-to-remove-samsung-push-service-on-a-smartphone ">it cannot be permanently disabled.</a> 107 <a href=" https://web.archive.org/web/20231213150111/https://www.nytimes.com/2023/11/12/technology/iphone-repair-apple-control.html ">To block non-Apple repairs, Apple encodes the iMonster serial number in the original parts</a>. This is called “parts pairing”. Swapping parts between working iMonsters of the same model causes malfunction or disabling of some functionalities. Part replacement may also trigger persistent alerts, unless it is done by an Apple store. 110 Twenty nine “beauty camera” apps that used to be on Google Play had one or more malicious functionalities, such as stealing users' photos instead of “beautifying” them, <a href=" https://www.androidpolice.com/2019/02/03/google-bans-29-beauty-camera-apps-from-the-play-store-that-steal-your-photos/ "> pushing unwanted and often malicious ads on users, and redirecting them to phishing sites</a> that stole their credentials. Furthermore, the user interface of most of them was designed to make uninstallation difficult. Vinte e nove aplicativos de “câmera de beleza” que costumavam estar no Google Play tinham uma ou mais funcionalidades maliciosas, como roubar fotos dos usuários em vez de “embelezá-las”, <a href=" https://www.teleanalysis.com/these-29-beauty-camera-apps-steal-private-photo/ "> empurrando anúncios indesejados e muitas vezes maliciosos para os usuários, e redirecionando-os para sites de <em>phishing</em></a> que roubaram suas credenciais. Além disso, a interface do usuário da maioria deles foi projetada para dificultar a desinstalação. 115 The Yandex company has started to <a href=" https://meduza.io/en/feature/2023/08/08/user-x-with-driver-y-traveled-from-point-a-to-point-b "> give away Yango taxi ride data to Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB)</a>. The Russian government (and whoever else receives the the data) thus has access to a wealth of personal information, including who traveled where, when, and with which driver. Yandex <a href=" https://yandex.ru/legal/confidential/?lang=en "> claims that it complies with European regulations</a> for data collected in the European Economic Area, Switzerland or Israel. But what about the rest of the world? 116 The Pinduoduo app <a href=" https://edition.cnn.com/2023/04/02/tech/china-pinduoduo-malware-cybersecurity-analysis-intl-hnk/index.html "> snoops on other apps, and takes control of them</a>. It also installs additional malware that is hard to remove. 117 Canada has fined the company Tim Hortons for making <a href=" https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2022/06/tim-hortons-coffee-app-broke-law-by-constantly-recording-users-movements/ "> an app that tracks people's movements</a> to learn things such as where they live, where they work, and when they visit competitors' stores. 118 The data broker X-Mode <a href=" https://themarkup.org/privacy/2022/01/27/gay-bi-dating-app-muslim-prayer-apps-sold-data-on-peoples-location-to-a-controversial-data-broker ">bought location data about 20,000 people collected by around 100 different malicious apps</a>. 145 This app is a spyware that can snoop on a lot of sensitive data, including user's location and contact list, and has <a href=" https://web.archive.org/web/20220321042716/https://old.reddit.com/r/wow/comments/bkd5ew/you_need_to_have_a_phone_to_attend_blizzcon_this/emg38xv/ "> near-complete control</a> over the phone. Esse aplicativo é um <i lang="en">spyware</i> que consegue bisbilhotar vários dados sensíveis, incluindo a localização e a lista de contato do usuário, e tem <a href=" https://old.reddit.com/r/wow/comments/bkd5ew/you_need_to_have_a_phone_to_attend_blizzcon_this/emg38xv/ "> controle quase completo</a> sobre seu telefone. 149 The MoviePass dis-service <a href=" https://www.cnet.com/culture/entertainment/moviepass-founder-wants-to-use-facial-recognition-to-score-you-free-movies/ "> is planning to use face recognition to track people's eyes</a> to make sure they won't put their phones down or look away during ads—and trackers. 154 The AppCensus database gives information on <a href=" https://www.appcensus.io/ "> how Android apps use and misuse users' personal data</a>. As of March 2019, nearly 78,000 have been analyzed, of which 24,000 (31%) transmit the <a href="/proprietary/proprietary-surveillance.html#M201812290"> Advertising ID</a> to other companies, and <a href=" https://blog.appcensus.io/2019/02/14/ad-ids-behaving-badly/ "> 18,000 (23% of the total) link this ID to hardware identifiers</a>, so that users cannot escape tracking by resetting it. O banco de dados do AppCensus fornece informações sobre <a href=" https://www.appcensus.mobi "> como os aplicativos de Android usam e fazem mau uso dos dados pessoais dos usuários</a>. Até março de 2019, quase 78.000 foram analisados, dos quais 24.000 (31%) transmitem o <a href="/proprietary/proprietary-surveillance.html#M201812290"> ID de publicidade</a> para outras empresas e <a href=" https://blog.appcensus.mobi/2019/02/14/ad-ids-behaving-badly/ "> 18.000 (23% do total) vinculam esse ID a identificadores de hardware</a>, para que os usuários não possam escapar do rastreamento redefinindo-o. 157 An investigation of the 150 most popular gratis VPN apps in Google Play found that <a href=" https://www.top10vpn.com/research/free-vpn-investigations/risk-index/ "> 25% fail to protect their users' privacy</a> due to DNS leaks. In addition, 85% feature intrusive permissions or functions in their source code—often used for invasive advertising—that could potentially also be used to spy on users. Other technical flaws were found as well. Uma investigação sobre os 150 aplicativos VPN mais populares do Google Play descobriu que <a href=" https://www.top10vpn.com/free-vpn-android-app-risk-index/ "> 25% deles não protegem a privacidade de seus usuários</a> devido a vazamentos de DNS. Além disso, 85% apresentam permissões intrusivas ou funções em seu código-fonte – muitas vezes usadas para publicidade invasiva – que também poderiam ser usadas para espionar usuários. Outras falhas técnicas foram encontradas também. 158 Moreover, a previous investigation had found that <a href=" https://www.top10vpn.com/research/free-vpn-investigations/ownership/ ">half of the top 10 gratis VPN apps have lousy privacy policies</a>. Além disso, uma investigação anterior descobrira que <a href=" https://www.top10vpn.com/free-vpn-app-investigation/ ">metade dos 10 aplicativos grátis e mais populares de VPN tinham péssimas políticas de privacidade</a>. 162 <a href=" https://www.vice.com/en/article/gy77wy/stop-using-third-party-weather-apps "> Other weather apps</a>, including Accuweather and WeatherBug, are tracking people's locations. <a href=" https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/gy77wy/stop-using-third-party-weather-apps "> Outros aplicativos de meteorologia</a>, incluindo Accuweather e WeatherBug, estão rastreando as localizações das pessoas. 167 Some Android apps <a href=" https://web.archive.org/web/20210418052600/https://www.androidauthority.com/apps-uninstall-trackers-917539/amp/ "> track the phones of users that have deleted them</a>. Alguns aplicativos de Android <a href=" https://www.androidauthority.com/apps-uninstall-trackers-917539/amp/ "> rastreiam os telefones de usuários que os excluíram</a>. 173 This is evidence that proprietary apps generally work against their users. To protect their privacy and freedom, Android users need to get rid of the proprietary software—both proprietary Android by <a href="https://replicant.us">switching to Replicant</a>, and the proprietary apps by getting apps from the free software only <a href="https://f-droid.org/">F-Droid store</a> that <a href=" https://f-droid.org/docs/Anti-Features/ "> prominently warns the user if an app contains anti-features</a>. Isso é evidência de que aplicativos privativos geralmente funcionam contra seus usuários. Para proteger sua privacidade e liberdade, os usuários do Android precisam se livrar do software privativo – tanto o Android privativo <a href="https://replicant.us">mudando para o Replicant</a> e os aplicativos privativos, obtendo aplicativos de software livre apenas da <a href="https://f-droid.org/">loja do F-Droid</a> que <a href=" https://f-droid.org/wiki/page/Antifeatures "> avisa o usuário de forma proeminente se um aplicativo contém características indesejadas</a>. 182 20 dishonest Android apps recorded <a href=" https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2017/07/stealthy-google-play-apps-recorded-calls-and-stole-e-mails-and-texts/ ">phone calls and sent them and text messages and emails to snoopers</a>. 20 aplicativos Android desonestos registram <a href=" https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2017/07/stealthy-google-play-apps-recorded-calls-and-stole-e-mails-and-texts ">telefonemas e mensagens de texto e e-mails enviados para bisbilhoteiros</a>. 207 A <a href=" https://research.csiro.au/isp/wp-content/uploads/sites/106/2016/08/paper-1.pdf "> research paper</a> that investigated the privacy and security of 283 Android VPN apps concluded that “in spite of the promises for privacy, security, and anonymity given by the majority of VPN apps—millions of users may be unawarely subject to poor security guarantees and abusive practices inflicted by VPN apps.” Um <a href=" https://research.csiro.au/ng/wp-content/uploads/sites/106/2016/08/paper-1.pdf "> artigo de pesquisa</a> que investigou a privacidade e a segurança de 283 aplicativos VPN para Android concluiu que, “apesar das promessas de privacidade, segurança e anonimato feitas pela maioria dos aplicativos VPN, milhões de usuários podem estar inadvertidamente sujeitos a garantias de segurança insatisfatórias e práticas abusivas infligidas por aplicativos VPN”. 221 Some portable phones <a href=" https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/kryptowire-discovered-mobile-phone-firmware-that-transmitted-personally-identifiable-information-pii-without-user-consent-or-disclosure-300362844.html ">are sold with spyware sending lots of data to China</a>. Alguns telefones portáteis <a href=" http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/kryptowire-discovered-mobile-phone-firmware-that-transmitted-personally-identifiable-information-pii-without-user-consent-or-disclosure-300362844.html ">são vendidos com <i lang="en">spyware</i> enviando muitos dados para a China</a>. 222 Facebook's new Magic Photo app <a href=" https://www.theregister.com/2015/11/10/facebook_scans_camera_for_your_friends/ "> scans your mobile phone's photo collections for known faces</a>, and suggests you circulate the picture you take according to who is in the frame. O novo aplicativo do Facebook, o Magic Photo, <a href=" https://www.theregister.co.uk/2015/11/10/facebook_scans_camera_for_your_friends/ "> percorre as coleções de fotos do seu celular em busca de rostos conhecidos</a> e sugere que você circule a foto tirada de acordo com quem está no quadro. 225 Facebook's app listens all the time, <a href=" https://www.independent.co.uk/tech/facebook-using-people-s-phones-to-listen-in-on-what-they-re-saying-claims-professor-a7057526.html ">to snoop on what people are listening to or watching</a>. In addition, it may be analyzing people's conversations to serve them with targeted advertisements. O aplicativo do Facebook escuta o tempo todo, <a href=" https://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-and-tech/news/facebook-using-people-s-phones-listen-what-they-re-saying-claims-professor-a7057526.html ">para bisbilhotar o que as pessoas estão ouvindo ou assistindo</a>. Além disso, pode estar analisando as conversas das pessoas para servi-las com anúncios direcionados. 226 A pregnancy test controller application not only can <a href=" https://www.theverge.com/2016/4/25/11503718/first-response-pregnancy-pro-test-bluetooth-app-security "> spy on many sorts of data in the phone, and in server accounts, it can alter them too</a>. Um aplicativo de controle de teste de gravidez não só pode <a href=" http://www.theverge.com/2016/4/25/11503718/first-response-pregnancy-pro-test-bluetooth-app-security "> espionar muitos tipos de dados no telefone e em contas de servidor, ele também pode alterá-los</a>. 228 The natural extension of monitoring people through “their” phones is <a href=" https://news.northwestern.edu/stories/2016/01/fool-activity-tracker "> proprietary software to make sure they can't “fool” the monitoring</a>. A extensão natural do monitoramento de pessoas por meio de “seus” telefones é o <a href=" http://www.northwestern.edu/newscenter/stories/2016/01/fool-activity-tracker.html "> software privativo garantir que eles não possam “enganar” o monitoramento</a>. 229 “Cryptic communication,” unrelated to the app's functionality, was <a href=" https://news.mit.edu/2015/data-transferred-android-apps-hiding-1119 "> found in the 500 most popular gratis Android apps</a>. “Comunicação enigmática” não relacionada à funcionalidade do aplicativo, foi <a href=" http://news.mit.edu/2015/data-transferred-android-apps-hiding-1119 "> encontrada nos 500 aplicativos Android grátis mais populares</a>. 233 According to Edward Snowden, <a href=" https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-34444233 ">agencies can take over smartphones</a> by sending hidden text messages which enable them to turn the phones on and off, listen to the microphone, retrieve geo-location data from the GPS, take photographs, read text messages, read call, location and web browsing history, and read the contact list. This malware is designed to disguise itself from investigation. De acordo com Edward Snowden, <a href=" http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-34444233 ">as agências podem assumir o controle de smartphones</a> enviando mensagens de texto ocultas que permitem ligar os telefones e desligar, ouvir o microfone, recuperar dados de geolocalização do GPS, tirar fotos, ler mensagens de texto, ler chamadas, localização e histórico de navegação na web e ler a lista de contatos. Este <em>malware</em> foi projetado para se disfarçar de investigação. 234 Like most “music screaming” disservices, Spotify is based on proprietary malware (DRM and snooping). In August 2015 it <a href=" https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/aug/21/spotify-faces-user-backlash-over-new-privacy-policy "> demanded users submit to increased snooping</a>, and some are starting to realize that it is nasty. Como a maioria dos desserviços de “gritos musicais”, Spotify é baseado em <em>malware</em> privativo (DRM e bisbilhotamento). Em agosto de 2015, <a href=" http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/aug/21/spotify-faces-user-backlash-over-new-privacy-policy "> exigia que os usuários se submetessem a um bisbilhotamento maior</a>, e alguns estão começando a perceber que é desagradável. 235 This article shows the <a href=" https://www.theregister.com/2015/08/21/spotify_worse_than_the_nsa/ "> twisted ways that they present snooping as a way to “serve” users better</a>—never mind whether they want that. This is a typical example of the attitude of the proprietary software industry towards those they have subjugated. Este artigo mostra as <a href=" https://www.theregister.co.uk/2015/08/21/spotify_worse_than_the_nsa/ "> formas tortuosas de apresentar o bisbilhotamento como uma forma de “servir” usuários melhores</a> – não importa se eles querem isso. Este é um exemplo típico da atitude da indústria de software privativo para com aqueles que eles subjugaram. 237 Many retail businesses publish cr…apps that ask to <a href=" https://www.delish.com/kitchen-tools/a43252/how-food-apps-use-data/ "> spy on the user's own data</a>—often many kinds. 239 Samsung phones come with <a href=" https://arstechnica.com/gadgets/2015/07/samsung-sued-for-loading-devices-with-unremovable-crapware-in-china/ ">apps that users can't delete</a>, and they send so much data that their transmission is a substantial expense for users. Said transmission, not wanted or requested by the user, clearly must constitute spying of some kind. Os telefones da Samsung vêm com <a href=" http://arstechnica.com/gadgets/2015/07/samsung-sued-for-loading-devices-with-unremovable-crapware-in-china/ "> aplicativos que os usuários não podem excluir</a> e enviam tantos dados que sua transmissão representa uma despesa substancial para os usuários. A referida transmissão, não desejada ou solicitada pelo usuário, deve claramente constituir espionagem de algum tipo. 242 Gratis Android apps (but not <a href="/philosophy/free-sw.html">free software</a>) connect to 100 <a href=" https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/may/06/free-android-apps-connect-tracking-advertising-websites ">tracking and advertising</a> URLs, on the average. Aplicativos grátis para Android (que não são <a href="/philosophy/free-sw.html">software livres</a>) conectam a 100 URLs de <a href=" http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/may/06/free-android-apps-connect-tracking-advertising-websites ">rastreamento e anúncios</a>, em média. 243 Widely used <a href=" https://freedom-to-tinker.com/2015/04/06/scan-this-or-scan-me-user-privacy-barcode-scanning-applications/ ">proprietary QR-code scanner apps snoop on the user</a>. This is in addition to the snooping done by the phone company, and perhaps by the OS in the phone. Aplicativos privativos amplamente usados de <a href=" https://freedom-to-tinker.com/blog/kollarssmith/scan-this-or-scan-me-user-privacy-barcode-scanning-applications/ ">leitura de código QR bisbilhotam o usuário</a>. Isso além do bisbilhotamento feito pela companhia telefônica e, talvez, pelo sistema operacional do telefone. 245 Many proprietary apps for mobile devices report which other apps the user has installed. <a href=" https://techcrunch.com/2014/11/26/twitter-app-graph/ ">Twitter is doing this in a way that at least is visible and optional</a>. Not as bad as what the others do. Muitos aplicativos privativos para dispositivos móveis relatam quais outros aplicativos o usuário instalou. <a href=" http://techcrunch.com/2014/11/26/twitter-app-graph/ "> O Twitter está fazendo isso de uma forma que pelo menos seja visível e opcional</a>. Não tão ruim quanto o que os outros fazem. 248 The nonfree Snapchat app's principal purpose is to restrict the use of data on the user's computer, but it does surveillance too: <a href=" https://www.theguardian.com/media/2013/dec/27/snapchat-may-be-exposed-hackers "> it tries to get the user's list of other people's phone numbers</a>. O principal objetivo do aplicativo não livre Snapchat é restringir o uso de dados no computador do usuário, mas ele também faz vigilância: <a href=" http://www.theguardian.com/media/2013/dec/27/snapchat-may-be-exposed-hackers "> tenta obter a lista do usuário dos números de telefone de outras pessoas</a>. 249 The Brightest Flashlight app <a href=" https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2013/dec/06/android-app-50m-downloads-sent-data-advertisers "> sends user data, including geolocation, for use by companies</a>. O aplicativo Brightest Flashlight <a href=" http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2013/dec/06/android-app-50m-downloads-sent-data-advertisers "> envia dados do usuário, incluindo geolocalização, para uso por empresas</a>. 251 Portable phones with GPS <a href=" https://www.aclu.org/issues/privacy-technology/location-tracking/you-are-being-tracked "> will send their GPS location on remote command, and users cannot stop them</a>. (The US says it will eventually require all new portable phones to have GPS.) Telefones portáteis com GPS <a href=" http://www.aclu.org/government-location-tracking-cell-phones-gps-devices-and-license-plate-readers "> enviarão sua localização GPS por comando remoto, e os usuários não podem impedi-los</a>. (Os EUA afirmam que eventualmente exigirão que todos os novos telefones portáteis tenham GPS.) 252 FTC says most mobile apps for children don't respect privacy: <a href=" https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2012/12/ftc-disclosures-severely-lacking-in-kids-mobile-appsand-its-getting-worse/ "> https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2012/12/ftc-disclosures-severely-lacking-in-kids-mobile-appsand-its-getting-worse/</a>. A FTC afirma que a maioria dos aplicativos móveis para crianças não respeita a privacidade: <a href=" http://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2012/12/ftc-disclosures-severely-lacking-in-kids-mobile-appsand-its-getting-worse/ "> http://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2012/12/ftc-disclosures-severely-lacking-in-kids-mobile-appsand-its-getting-worse/</a>. 253 Some manufacturers add a <a href=" https://androidsecuritytest.com/features/logs-and-services/loggers/carrieriq/ "> hidden general surveillance package such as Carrier IQ</a>. Alguns fabricantes adicionam um <a href=" http://androidsecuritytest.com/features/logs-and-services/loggers/carrieriq/ "> pacote oculto de vigilância geral, como o Carrier IQ</a>. 259 <a href=" https://www.fsf.org/campaigns/secure-boot-vs-restricted-boot/ "> Mobile devices that come with Windows 8 are tyrants</a>. <a href=" https://fsf.org/campaigns/secure-boot-vs-restricted-boot/ "> Dispositivos móveis que vêm com o Windows 8 são tiranos</a>. 262 Please see the <a href="/server/standards/README.translations.html">Translations README</a> for information on coordinating and contributing translations of this article. A equipe de traduções para o português brasileiro se esforça para oferecer traduções precisas e de boa qualidade, mas não estamos isentos de erros. Por favor, envie seus comentários e sugestões em geral sobre as traduções para <a href=" mailto:web-translators@gnu.org "><web-translators@gnu.org></a>. </p><p>Consulte o <a href="/server/standards/README.translations.html">Guia para as traduções</a> para mais informações sobre a coordenação e a contribuição com traduções das páginas deste site.
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