malware-mobiles.de.po

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8 | {+</a>&nbsp;/+} <a [-href="/proprietary/proprietary.html">Other examples
| of proprietary malware</a>-]
| {+href="/proprietary/proprietary.html">Malware</a>&nbsp;/ By
| product&nbsp;/+} 
</a>&nbsp;/ <a href="/proprietary/proprietary.html">Malware</a>&nbsp;/ By product&nbsp;/ 
<a href="/proprietary/">Weitere Beispiele proprietärer Schadsoftware</a> 
10 | Nonfree (proprietary) software is very often malware (designed to mistreat
| the user). Nonfree software is controlled by its developers, which puts
| them in a position of power over the users; <a
| href="/philosophy/free-software-even-more-important.html">that is the
| basic injustice</a>. The developers {+and manufacturers+} often exercise
| that power to the detriment of the users they ought to serve. 
Nonfree (proprietary) software is very often malware (designed to mistreat the user). Nonfree software is controlled by its developers, which puts them in a position of power over the users; <a href="/philosophy/free-software-even-more-important.html">that is the basic injustice</a>. The developers and manufacturers often exercise that power to the detriment of the users they ought to serve. 
Unfreie (proprietäre) Software entspricht sehr häufig einem Schadprogramm (entworfen, um <ins>unerwünschte und gegebenenfalls schädliche Funktionen auszuführen,</ins> den Benutzer also schlecht behandeln). Unfreie Software wird von den Entwicklern kontrolliert, welches sie in eine Position der Macht gegenüber den Nutzern versetzt. <a href="/philosophy/free-software-even-more-important">Das ist die grundlegende Ungerechtigkeit!</a> Häufig üben Entwickler diese Macht zum Schaden der Benutzer aus, denen sie eigentlich dienen sollte. 
13  
The malware we list here is present in every phone, or in software that is not made by Apple or Google (including its subsidiaries). Malicious functionalities in mobile software released by Apple or Google are listed in dedicated pages, <a href="/proprietary/malware-apple.html">Apple's Operating Systems are Malware</a> and <a href="/proprietary/malware-google.html">Google's Software Is Malware</a> respectively. 
 
17  
The authorities in Venice track the <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/travel/article/venice-control-room-tourism/index.html"> movements of all tourists</a> using their portable phones. The article says that <em>at present</em> the system is configured to report only aggregated information. But that could be changed. What will that system do 10 years from now? What will a similar system in another country do? Those are the questions this raises. 
 
21 | <a [-href="#deception">Deception</a>-]
| {+href="#addictions">Addictions</a>+} 
<a href="#addictions">Addictions</a> 
<a href="#deception">Täuschung</a> 
24 | <a [-href="#back-doors">Back doors</a>-] {+href="#drm">DRM</a>+} 
<a href="#drm">DRM</a> 
<a href="#back-doors">Hintertüren</a> 
27 | <a [-href="#surveillance">Surveillance</a>-]
| {+href="#jails">Jails</a>+} 
<a href="#jails">Jails</a> 
<a href="#surveillance">Überwachung</a> 
28 | <a [-href="#surveillance">Surveillance</a>-]
| {+href="#manipulation">Manipulation</a>+} 
<a href="#manipulation">Manipulation</a> 
<a href="#surveillance">Überwachung</a> 
31 | <a [-href="#sabotage">Sabotage</a>-] {+href="#tyrants">Tyrants</a>+} 
<a href="#tyrants">Tyrants</a> 
<a href="#sabotage">Sabotage</a> 
33  
Many popular mobile games include a random-reward system called <a href="#gacha"><i>gacha</i></a> which is especially effective on children. One variant of gacha was declared illegal in Japan in 2012, but the other variants are still <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/olliebarder/2016/04/04/japanese-mobile-gaming-still-cant-shake-off-the-spectre-of-exploitation/"> luring players into compulsively spending</a> inordinate amounts of money on virtual toys. 
 
36 | The back door <a {+class="not-a-duplicate"+}
| href="http://www.osnews.com/story/27416/The_second_operating_system_hiding_in_every_mobile_phone">
| may take the form of bugs that have gone 20 years unfixed</a>. The choice
| to leave the security holes in place is morally equivalent to writing a
| back door. 
The back door <a class="not-a-duplicate" href="http://www.osnews.com/story/27416/The_second_operating_system_hiding_in_every_mobile_phone"> may take the form of bugs that have gone 20 years unfixed</a>. The choice to leave the security holes in place is morally equivalent to writing a back door. 
Die Hintertür <a href="https://www.osnews.com/story/27416/The_second_operating_system_hiding_in_every_mobile_phone" title="The second operating system hiding in every mobile phone, unter: https://www.osnews.com/story/27416/The_second_operating_system_hiding_in_every_mobile_phone, OSNews 2017.">kann die Form von Programmfehlern haben, die 20 Jahre ungefixt blieben</a>. Die Entscheidung, die Sicherheitslücken zu belassen, ist moralisch gleichbedeutend mit dem Schreiben einer Hintertür. 
39  
The universal back door is apparently also used to make phones <a href="http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2013/07/22/nsa_can_reportedly_track_cellphones_even_when_they_re_turned_off.html"> transmit even when they are turned off</a>. This means their movements are tracked, and may also make the listening feature work. 
Die universelle Hintertür wird offenbar auch dazu genutzt um Telefone, <a href="//www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2013/07/22/nsa_can_reportedly_track_cellphones_even_when_they_re_turned_off.html" title="NSA Can Reportedly Track Phones Even When They're Turned Off, unter: slate.com 2013.">selbst wenn sie ausgeschaltet sind, übertragen zu lassen</a>. Das bedeutet, deren Bewegungen werden nachverfolgt und möglicherweise funktioniert das Abhören auch. 
40  
Android phones subsidized by the US government come with <a href="https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2020/01/us-government-funded-android-phones-come-preinstalled-with-unremovable-malware/"> preinstalled adware and a back door for forcing installation of apps</a>. 
 
41  
The adware is in a modified version of an essential system configuration app. The back door is a surreptitious addition to a program whose stated purpose is to be a <a href="https://www.zdnet.com/article/unremovable-malware-found-preinstalled-on-low-end-smartphone-sold-in-the-us/"> universal back door for firmware</a>. 
 
43  
A very popular app found in the Google Play store contained a module that was designed to <a href="https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2019/08/google-play-app-with-100-million-downloads-executed-secret-payloads/">secretly install malware on the user's computer</a>. The app developers regularly used it to make the computer download and execute any code they wanted. 
 
45 | Xiaomi phones come with <a
| [-href="https://www.thijsbroenink.com/2016/09/xiaomis-analytics-app-reverse-engineered">-]
| {+href="https://web.archive.org/web/20190424082647/http://blog.thijsbroenink.com/2016/09/xiaomis-analytics-app-reverse-engineered/">+}
| a universal back door in the application processor, for Xiaomi's use</a>. 
Xiaomi phones come with <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20190424082647/http://blog.thijsbroenink.com/2016/09/xiaomis-analytics-app-reverse-engineered/"> a universal back door in the application processor, for Xiaomi's use</a>. 
Xiaomi Telefone kommen mit einer <a href="https://www.thijsbroenink.com/2016/09/xiaomis-analytics-app-reverse-engineered">universellen Hintertür im Applikations-Prozessor</a>, zur Nutzung durch Xiaomi. 
49 | <a
| href="http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/dec/18/chinese-android-phones-coolpad-hacker-backdoor">
| A Chinese version of Android has a universal back door</a>. Nearly all
| models of mobile phones have a <a [-href="#universal-back-door">-]
| {+href="#universal-back-door-phone-modem">+} universal back door in the
| modem chip</a>. So why did Coolpad bother to introduce another? Because
| this one is controlled by Coolpad. 
<a href="http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/dec/18/chinese-android-phones-coolpad-hacker-backdoor"> A Chinese version of Android has a universal back door</a>. Nearly all models of mobile phones have a <a href="#universal-back-door-phone-modem"> universal back door in the modem chip</a>. So why did Coolpad bother to introduce another? Because this one is controlled by Coolpad. 
Eine <a href="//www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/dec/18/chinese-android-phones-coolpad-hacker-backdoor" title="Chinese Android phones contain in-built hacker ‘backdoor’, unter: theguardian.com 2014.">chinesische Android-Variante verfügt über eine universelle Hintertür</a>. Nahezu alle Smartphone-Modelle verfügen über eine <a href="#universal-back-door">universelle Hintertür im Modem-Chip</a>. Warum also bemüht sich Coolpad, eine andere einzuführen? Weil diese durch Coolpad kontrolliert wird. 
52  
Many Android apps fool their users by asking them to decide what permissions to give the program, and then <a href="https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2019/07/10/android-apps-sidestepping-permissions-to-access-sensitive-data/"> bypassing these permissions</a>. 
 
55 | [-<a href="#drm">Digital-]{+Digital+} restrictions [-management</a>-]
| {+management,+} or [-&ldquo;DRM&rdquo; means-] {+&ldquo;DRM,&rdquo; refers
| to+} functionalities designed to restrict what users can do with the data
| in their computers. 
Digital restrictions management, or &ldquo;DRM,&rdquo; refers to functionalities designed to restrict what users can do with the data in their computers. 
<a href="#drm">Digitale Rechte-Minderung (DRM)</a><br />&#8209;&#160;Funktionalitäten, entwickelt um zu beschränken, was Nutzer mit den Daten auf ihren Rechnern tun können. 
56  
The Netflix Android app <a href="http://torrentfreak.com/netflix-cracks-down-on-vpn-and-proxy-pirates-150103/"> forces the use of Google DNS</a>. This is one of the methods that Netflix uses to enforce the geolocation restrictions dictated by the movie studios. 
Die Netflix Android App <a href="//torrentfreak.com/netflix-cracks-down-on-vpn-and-proxy-pirates-150103/">erzwingt die Verwendung von Google DNS</a>. Dies ist eine der Methoden, mit denen Netflix die von den Filmstudios vorgegebene Ortungsbeschränkungen durchsetzt. 
59  
Out of 21 gratis Android antivirus apps that were tested by security researchers, eight <a href="https://www.comparitech.com/antivirus/android-antivirus-vulnerabilities/"> failed to detect a test virus</a>. All of them asked for dangerous permissions or contained advertising trackers, with seven being more risky than the average of the 100 most popular Android apps. 
 
64  
The CIA exploited existing vulnerabilities in &ldquo;smart&rdquo; TVs and phones to design a malware that <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-and-tech/news/wikileaks-vault-7-android-iphone-cia-phones-handsets-tv-smart-julian-assange-a7616651.html"> spies through their microphones and cameras while making them appear to be turned off</a>. Since the spyware sniffs signals, it bypasses encryption. 
 
71  
A half-blind security critique of a tracking app: it found that <a href="http://www.consumerreports.org/mobile-security-software/glow-pregnancy-app-exposed-women-to-privacy-threats/"> blatant flaws allowed anyone to snoop on a user's personal data</a>. The critique fails entirely to express concern that the app sends the personal data to a server, where the <em>developer</em> gets it all. This &ldquo;service&rdquo; is for suckers! 
Eine halbblinde Sicherheitsrezension einer Verfolger-App stellte fest: <a href="//www.consumerreports.org/mobile-security-software/glow-pregnancy-app-exposed-women-to-privacy-threats/">eklatante Fehler erlaubten jedermann in den persönlichen Nutzerdaten herumzuschnüffeln.</a>. Die Rezension versäumt jedoch die Besorgnis zum Ausdruck zu bringen, dass die App selbst personenbezogene Daten an einen Server sendet, wo der „Entwickler“ sämtliche Daten abgreift. Dieser „Dienst“ ist für (gutgläubige) Trottel! 
73  
A bug in a proprietary ASN.1 library, used in cell phone towers as well as cell phones and routers, <a href="http://arstechnica.com/security/2016/07/software-flaw-puts-mobile-phones-and-networks-at-risk-of-complete-takeover">allows taking control of those systems</a>. 
Ein Fehler in einer bei Sendemasten sowie Mobiltelefonen und Routern genutzten proprietären ASN.1-Bibliothek <a href="//arstechnica.com/security/2016/07/software-flaw-puts-mobile-phones-and-networks-at-risk-of-complete-takeover" title="Dan Goodin, Software flaw puts mobile phones and networks at risk of complete takeover, unter: arstechnica.com 2016.">ermöglicht die Kontrolle über jene Systeme</a>. 
74 | Many proprietary payment apps <a
| href="http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-03-10/many-mobile-payments-startups-aren-t-properly-securing-user-data">[-
| -]transmit personal data in an insecure way</a>. However, the worse aspect
| of these apps is that <a
| href="/philosophy/surveillance-vs-democracy.html">payment is not
| anonymous</a>. 
Many proprietary payment apps <a href="http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-03-10/many-mobile-payments-startups-aren-t-properly-securing-user-data">transmit personal data in an insecure way</a>. However, the worse aspect of these apps is that <a href="/philosophy/surveillance-vs-democracy.html">payment is not anonymous</a>. 
Viele proprietäre Zahlungs-Apps <a href="//www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-03-10/many-mobile-payments-startups-aren-t-properly-securing-user-data">senden persönliche Daten auf eine unsichere Art und Weise</a>. Unerfreulichster Aspekt dieser Apps ist jedoch, dass das <a href="/philosophy/surveillance-vs-democracy">Bezahlverfahren nicht anonym</a> ist. 
75 | <a
| href="http://phys.org/news/2015-05-app-vulnerability-threatens-millions-users.html">
| Many smartphone apps use insecure authentication methods when storing your
| personal data on remote [-servers.</a>-] {+servers</a>.+} This leaves
| personal information like email addresses, passwords, and health
| information vulnerable. Because many of these apps are proprietary it
| makes it hard to impossible to know which apps are at risk. 
<a href="http://phys.org/news/2015-05-app-vulnerability-threatens-millions-users.html"> Many smartphone apps use insecure authentication methods when storing your personal data on remote servers</a>. This leaves personal information like email addresses, passwords, and health information vulnerable. Because many of these apps are proprietary it makes it hard to impossible to know which apps are at risk. 
<a href="//phys.org/news/2015-05-app-vulnerability-threatens-millions-users.html" title="App data vulnerability threatens millions of users, unter: phys.org 2015.">Viele Smartphone-Applikationen verwenden unsichere Authentifizierungsmethoden bei der Speicherung IHRER persönlichen Daten auf (irgendwelchen) Internetservern</a>. Dies macht persönliche Daten wie E-Mail-Adressen, Passwörter und Gesundheitsinformationen angreifbar. Da viele dieser Apps proprietär sind, macht es schwierig&#160;&#8209;&#160;wenn nicht gar unmöglich&#160;&#8209;&#160;zu wissen, welche Apps eine Gefahr darstellen. 
76 || No change detected. The change might only be in amounts of spaces. 
An app to prevent &ldquo;identity theft&rdquo; (access to personal data) by storing users' data on a special server <a href="http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2014/05/id-theft-protector-lifelock-deletes-user-data-over-concerns-that-app-isnt-safe/">was deactivated by its developer</a> which had discovered a security flaw. 
Eine Applikation, die „Identitätsdiebstahl“ (Zugriff auf persönliche Daten) durch Speichern von Nutzerdaten auf einem speziellen Server verhindern soll, <a href="//arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2014/05/id-theft-protector-lifelock-deletes-user-data-over-concerns-that-app-isnt-safe/" title="ID theft protector LifeLock deletes user data over concerns that app isn’t safe, unter: arstechnica.com 2014.">wurde vom Entwickler deaktiviert</a>, als dieser eine Sicherheitslücke entdeckte. 
78  
The <a href="http://arstechnica.com/security/2014/02/crypto-weaknesses-in-whatsapp-the-kind-of-stuff-the-nsa-would-love/">insecurity of WhatsApp</a> makes eavesdropping a snap. 
Die <a href="//arstechnica.com/security/2014/02/crypto-weaknesses-in-whatsapp-the-kind-of-stuff-the-nsa-would-love/" title="Crypto weaknesses in WhatsApp “the kind of stuff the NSA would love”, unter: arstechnica.com 2014.">Unsicherheit von WhatsApp [engl.]</a> macht Abhören zum Kinderspiel. 
79 | <a
| [-href="http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/privacy-scandal-nsa-can-spy-on-smart-phone-data-a-920971.html">-]
| {+href="https://web.archive.org/web/20180816030205/http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/privacy-scandal-nsa-can-spy-on-smart-phone-data-a-920971.html">+}
| The NSA can tap data in smart phones, including iPhones, Android, and
| BlackBerry</a>. While there is not much detail here, it seems that this
| does not operate via the universal back door that we know nearly all
| portable phones have. It may involve exploiting various bugs. There are
| <a
| href="http://www.osnews.com/story/27416/The_second_operating_system_hiding_in_every_mobile_phone">
| lots of bugs in the phones' radio software</a>. 
<a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20180816030205/http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/privacy-scandal-nsa-can-spy-on-smart-phone-data-a-920971.html"> The NSA can tap data in smart phones, including iPhones, Android, and BlackBerry</a>. While there is not much detail here, it seems that this does not operate via the universal back door that we know nearly all portable phones have. It may involve exploiting various bugs. There are <a href="http://www.osnews.com/story/27416/The_second_operating_system_hiding_in_every_mobile_phone"> lots of bugs in the phones' radio software</a>. 
US-Geheimdienst <a href="//www.spiegel.de/international/world/privacy-scandal-nsa-can-spy-on-smart-phone-data-a-920971.html" title="NSA Can Spy on Smart Phone Data, unter: spiegel.de 2013.">NSA kann sich Zugang zu iPhone- und BlackBerry-Geräten sowie zu Geräten mit Android-Betriebssystem verschaffen</a>. Es gibt zwar kaum Details, es scheint aber, dass dies nicht über die universelle Hintertür funktioniert, von der wir wissen, dass sie nahezu alle tragbaren Telefone haben. Dies kann verschiedene ausnutzbare Programmfehler einschließen. Es gibt viele <a href="//www.osnews.com/story/27416/The_second_operating_system_hiding_in_every_mobile_phone" title="The second operating system hiding in every mobile phone, unter: snews.com 2013.">Programmfehler in der Mobilfunksoftware</a> von Smartphones.<a href="#tn01" id="tn01-ref" class="transnote">[1]</a> 
82  
The <a href="https://www.wired.com/story/weddings-social-media-apps-photos-memories-miscarriage-problem/">WeddingWire app saves people's wedding photos forever and hands over data to others</a>, giving users no control over their personal information/data. The app also sometimes shows old photos and memories to users, without giving them any control over this either. 
 
83  
Samsung phones come preloaded with <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-01-08/samsung-phone-users-get-a-shock-they-can-t-delete-facebook"> a version of the Facebook app that can't be deleted</a>. <a href="https://www.infopackets.com/news/10484/truth-behind-undeletable-facebook-app"> Facebook claims this is a stub</a> which doesn't do anything, but we have to take their word for it, and there is the permanent risk that the app will be activated by an automatic update. 
 
84  
Preloading crapware along with a nonfree operating system is common practice, but by making the crapware undeletable, Facebook and Samsung (<a class="not-a-duplicate" href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-01-08/samsung-phone-users-get-a-shock-they-can-t-delete-facebook">among others</a>) are going one step further in their hijacking of users' devices. 
 
86  
The Femm &ldquo;fertility&rdquo; app is secretly a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/may/30/revealed-womens-fertility-app-is-funded-by-anti-abortion-campaigners"> tool for propaganda</a> by natalist Christians. It spreads distrust for contraception. 
 
89  
A new app published by Google <a href="https://www.xda-developers.com/google-device-lock-controller-banks-payments/">lets banks and creditors deactivate people's Android devices</a> if they fail to make payments. If someone's device gets deactivated, it will be limited to basic functionality, such as emergency calling and access to settings. 
 
90  
Samsung is forcing its smartphone users in Hong Kong (and Macau) <a href="https://blog.headuck.com/2020/10/12/samsung-phones-force-mainland-china-dns-service-upon-hong-kong-wifi-users/">to use a public DNS in Mainland China</a>, using software update released in September 2020, which causes many unease and privacy concerns. 
 
91  
Twenty nine &ldquo;beauty camera&rdquo; apps that used to be on Google Play had one or more malicious functionalities, such as stealing users' photos instead of &ldquo;beautifying&rdquo; them, <a href="https://www.teleanalysis.com/these-29-beauty-camera-apps-steal-private-photo/"> pushing unwanted and often malicious ads on users, and redirecting them to phishing sites</a> that stole their credentials. Furthermore, the user interface of most of them was designed to make uninstallation difficult. 
 
93  
Apple and Samsung deliberately <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/oct/24/apple-samsung-fined-for-slowing-down-phones">degrade the performance of older phones to force users to buy their newer phones</a>. 
 
95 | See above for the [-<a href="#universal-back-door">general-] {+general+}
| universal back [-door</a>-] {+door+} in essentially all mobile phones,
| which permits converting them into {+<a class="not-a-duplicate"
| href="#universal-back-door-phone-modem">+} full-time listening
| [-devices.-] {+devices</a>.+} 
See above for the general universal back door in essentially all mobile phones, which permits converting them into <a class="not-a-duplicate" href="#universal-back-door-phone-modem"> full-time listening devices</a>. 
Siehe oben für die in praktisch allen Mobiltelefonen vorhandene <a href="#universal-back-door">allgemeine universelle Hintertür</a>, die es ermöglicht, sie in Vollzeit-Abhörgeräte umzuschalten. 
96  
<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2021/jun/17/nine-out-of-10-health-apps-harvest-user-data-global-study-shows">Almost all proprietary health apps harvest users' data</a>, including sensitive health information, tracking identifiers, and cookies to track user activities. Some of these applications are tracking users across different platforms. 
 
97  
<a href="https://techcrunch.com/2021/06/03/tiktok-just-gave-itself-permission-to-collect-biometric-data-on-u-s-users-including-faceprints-and-voiceprints/">TikTok apps collect biometric identifiers and biometric information from users' smartphones</a>. The company behind it does whatever it wants and collects whatever data it can. 
 
98  
Many cr&hellip;apps, developed by various companies for various organizations, do <a href="https://www.expressvpn.com/digital-security-lab/investigation-xoth"> location tracking unknown to those companies and those organizations</a>. It's actually some widely used libraries that do the tracking. 
 
100  
Baidu apps were <a href="https://www.zdnet.com/article/baidus-android-apps-caught-collecting-sensitive-user-details/"> caught collecting sensitive personal data</a> that can be used for lifetime tracking of users, and putting them in danger. More than 1.4 billion people worldwide are affected by these proprietary apps, and users' privacy is jeopardized by this surveillance tool. Data collected by Baidu may be handed over to the Chinese government, possibly putting Chinese people in danger. 
 
101  
Most apps are malware, but Trump's campaign app, like Modi's campaign app, is <a href="https://www.technologyreview.com/2020/06/21/1004228/trumps-data-hungry-invasive-app-is-a-voter-surveillance-tool-of-extraordinary-scope/"> especially nasty malware, helping companies snoop on users as well as snooping on them itself</a>. 
 
103  
Xiaomi phones <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/2020/04/30/exclusive-warning-over-chinese-mobile-giant-xiaomi-recording-millions-of-peoples-private-web-and-phone-use/">report many actions the user takes</a>: starting an app, looking at a folder, visiting a website, listening to a song. They send device identifying information too. 
 
104  
Other nonfree programs snoop too. For instance, Spotify and other streaming dis-services make a dossier about each user, and <a href="/malware/proprietary-surveillance.html#M201508210"> they make users identify themselves to pay</a>. Out, out, damned Spotify! 
 
106  
Google, Apple, and Microsoft (and probably some other companies) <a href="https://www.lifewire.com/wifi-positioning-system-1683343">are collecting people's access points and GPS coordinates (which can identify people's precise location) even if their GPS is turned off</a>, without the person's consent, using proprietary software implemented in person's smartphone. Though merely asking for permission would not necessarily legitimize this. 
 
107  
The Alipay Health Code app estimates whether the user has Covid-19 and <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/01/business/china-coronavirus-surveillance.html"> tells the cops directly</a>. 
 
108  
The ToToc messaging app seems to be a <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/22/us/politics/totok-app-uae.html"> spying tool for the government of the United Arab Emirates</a>. Any nonfree program could be doing this, and that is a good reason to use free software instead. 
 
110  
iMonsters and Android phones, when used for work, give employers powerful <a href="https://www.fastcompany.com/90440073/if-you-use-your-personal-phone-for-work-say-goodbye-to-your-privacy"> snooping and sabotage capabilities</a> if they install their own software on the device. Many employers demand to do this. For the employee, this is simply nonfree software, as fundamentally unjust and as dangerous as any other nonfree software. 
 
111  
The Facebook app <a href="https://eu.usatoday.com/story/tech/talkingtech/2019/09/09/facebook-app-social-network-tracking-your-every-move/2270305001/"> tracks users even when it is turned off</a>, after tricking them into giving the app broad permissions in order to use one of its functionalities. 
 
112  
Some nonfree period-tracking apps including MIA Fem and Maya <a href="https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/meghara/period-tracker-apps-facebook-maya-mia-fem"> send intimate details of users' lives to Facebook</a>. 
 
113  
Keeping track of who downloads a proprietary program is a form of surveillance. There is a proprietary program for adjusting a certain telescopic rifle sight. <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/2019/09/06/exclusive-feds-demand-apple-and-google-hand-over-names-of-10000-users-of-a-gun-scope-app/"> A US prosecutor has demanded the list of all the 10,000 or more people who have installed it</a>. 
 
115  
Many unscrupulous mobile-app developers keep finding ways to <a href="https://www.cnet.com/tech/mobile/more-than-1000-android-apps-harvest-your-data-even-after-you-deny-permissions/"> bypass user's settings</a>, regulations, and privacy-enhancing features of the operating system, in order to gather as much private data as they possibly can. 
 
117  
Many Android apps can track users' movements even when the user says <a href="https://www.theverge.com/2019/7/8/20686514/android-covert-channel-permissions-data-collection-imei-ssid-location"> not to allow them access to locations</a>. 
 
119  
In spite of Apple's supposed commitment to privacy, iPhone apps contain trackers that are busy at night <a href="https://www.oregonlive.com/opinion/2019/05/its-3-am-do-you-know-who-your-iphone-is-talking-to.html"> sending users' personal information to third parties</a>. 
 
121  
BlizzCon 2019 imposed a <a href="https://arstechnica.com/gaming/2019/05/blizzcon-2019-tickets-revolve-around-invasive-poorly-reviewed-smartphone-app/"> requirement to run a proprietary phone app</a> to be allowed into the event. 
 
122  
This app is a spyware that can snoop on a lot of sensitive data, including user's location and contact list, and has <a href="https://old.reddit.com/r/wow/comments/bkd5ew/you_need_to_have_a_phone_to_attend_blizzcon_this/emg38xv/"> near-complete control</a> over the phone. 
 
123  
Data collected by menstrual and pregnancy monitoring apps is often <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/apr/13/theres-a-dark-side-to-womens-health-apps-menstrual-surveillance"> available to employers and insurance companies</a>. Even though the data is &ldquo;anonymized and aggregated,&rdquo; it can easily be traced back to the woman who uses the app. 
 
124  
This has harmful implications for women's rights to equal employment and freedom to make their own pregnancy choices. Don't use these apps, even if someone offers you a reward to do so. A free-software app that does more or less the same thing without spying on you is available from <a href="https://search.f-droid.org/?q=menstr">F-Droid</a>, and <a href="https://dcs.megaphone.fm/BLM6228935164.mp3?key=7e4b8f7018d13cdc2b5ea6e5772b6b8f"> a new one is being developed</a>. 
 
125  
Many Android phones come with a huge number of <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20190326145122/https://elpais.com/elpais/2019/03/22/inenglish/1553244778_819882.html"> preinstalled nonfree apps that have access to sensitive data without users' knowledge</a>. These hidden apps may either call home with the data, or pass it on to user-installed apps that have access to the network but no direct access to the data. This results in massive surveillance on which the user has absolutely no control. 
 
126  
A study of 24 &ldquo;health&rdquo; apps found that 19 of them <a href="https://www.vice.com/en/article/pan9e8/health-apps-can-share-your-data-everywhere-new-study-shows"> send sensitive personal data to third parties</a>, which can use it for invasive advertising or discriminating against people in poor medical condition. 
 
128  
Facebook offered a convenient proprietary library for building mobile apps, which also <a href="https://boingboing.net/2019/02/23/surveillance-zucksterism.html"> sent personal data to Facebook</a>. Lots of companies built apps that way and released them, apparently not realizing that all the personal data they collected would go to Facebook as well. 
 
130  
The AppCensus database gives information on <a href="https://www.appcensus.mobi"> how Android apps use and misuse users' personal data</a>. As of March 2019, nearly 78,000 have been analyzed, of which 24,000 (31%) transmit the <a href="/proprietary/proprietary-surveillance.html#M201812290"> Advertising ID</a> to other companies, and <a href="https://blog.appcensus.mobi/2019/02/14/ad-ids-behaving-badly/"> 18,000 (23% of the total) link this ID to hardware identifiers</a>, so that users cannot escape tracking by resetting it. 
 
132  
Many nonfree apps have a surveillance feature for <a href="https://techcrunch.com/2019/02/06/iphone-session-replay-screenshots/"> recording all the users' actions</a> in interacting with the app. 
 
133  
An investigation of the 150 most popular gratis VPN apps in Google Play found that <a href="https://www.top10vpn.com/free-vpn-android-app-risk-index/"> 25% fail to protect their users' privacy</a> due to DNS leaks. In addition, 85% feature intrusive permissions or functions in their source code&mdash;often used for invasive advertising&mdash;that could potentially also be used to spy on users. Other technical flaws were found as well. 
 
134  
Moreover, a previous investigation had found that <a href="https://www.top10vpn.com/free-vpn-app-investigation/">half of the top 10 gratis VPN apps have lousy privacy policies</a>. 
 
135  
<small>(It is unfortunate that these articles talk about &ldquo;free apps.&rdquo; These apps are gratis, but they are <em>not</em> <a href="/philosophy/free-sw.html">free software</a>.)</small> 
 
136  
The Weather Channel app <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2019/jan/04/weather-channel-app-lawsuit-location-data-selling"> stored users' locations to the company's server</a>. The company is being sued, demanding that it notify the users of what it will do with the data. 
 
138  
<a href="https://www.vice.com/en/article/gy77wy/stop-using-third-party-weather-apps"> Other weather apps</a>, including Accuweather and WeatherBug, are tracking people's locations. 
 
139  
Around 40% of gratis Android apps <a href="https://privacyinternational.org/report/2647/how-apps-android-share-data-facebook-report"> report on the user's actions to Facebook</a>. 
 
142  
Facebook's app got &ldquo;consent&rdquo; to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/dec/06/facebook-emails-reveal-discussions-over-call-log-consent"> upload call logs automatically from Android phones</a> while disguising what the &ldquo;consent&rdquo; was for. 
 
143  
Some Android apps <a href="https://www.androidauthority.com/apps-uninstall-trackers-917539/amp/"> track the phones of users that have deleted them</a>. 
 
155 | AI-powered driving apps can <a
| [-href="https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/43nz9p/ai-powered-driving-apps-can-track-your-every-move">-]
| {+href="https://www.vice.com/en/article/43nz9p/ai-powered-driving-apps-can-track-your-every-move">+}
| track your every move</a>. 
AI-powered driving apps can <a href="https://www.vice.com/en/article/43nz9p/ai-powered-driving-apps-can-track-your-every-move"> track your every move</a>. 
KI-gestützte Apps zur Steuerung von Fahrzeugen können <a href="https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/43nz9p/ai-powered-driving-apps-can-track-your-every-move" title="AI-Powered Driving Apps Can Track Your Every Move, Motherboard 2017.">jede Bewegung verfolgen</a>. 
156 | The Sarahah app <a
| href="https://theintercept.com/2017/08/27/hit-app-sarahah-quietly-uploads-your-address-book/">
| uploads all phone numbers and email addresses</a> in user's address book
| to developer's server. [-Note that this article misuses the words
| &ldquo;<a href="/philosophy/free-sw.html">free software</a>&rdquo;
| referring to zero price.-] 
The Sarahah app <a href="https://theintercept.com/2017/08/27/hit-app-sarahah-quietly-uploads-your-address-book/"> uploads all phone numbers and email addresses</a> in user's address book to developer's server. 
Die App <b>Sarahah</b> <a href="https://theintercept.com/2017/08/27/hit-app-sarahah-quietly-uploads-your-address-book/">lädt alle Telefonnummern und E-Mail-Adressen</a> aus Adressbuch des Nutzers an Server des Entwicklers hoch.<br />Hinweis: Dieser Artikel bezieht sich mit Worten „<a href="/philosophy/free-sw.html" xml:lang="en" lang="en">Free Software</a>“ missbräuchlich auf Null-Preis. 
157  
<small>(Note that this article misuses the words &ldquo;<a href="/philosophy/free-sw.html">free software</a>&rdquo; referring to zero price.)</small> 
 
164 | Apps for BART <a
| [-href="https://consumerist.com/2017/05/23/passengers-say-commuter-rail-app-illegally-collects-personal-user-data/">snoop-]
| {+href="https://web.archive.org/web/20171124190046/https://consumerist.com/2017/05/23/passengers-say-commuter-rail-app-illegally-collects-personal-user-data/">
| snoop+} on users</a>. 
Apps for BART <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20171124190046/https://consumerist.com/2017/05/23/passengers-say-commuter-rail-app-illegally-collects-personal-user-data/"> snoop on users</a>. 
Apps für <i>Bay Area Rapid Transit</i> (BART), <ins>ein öffentliches Nahverkehrsunternehmen im Gebiet um die Bucht von San Francisco, </ins><a href="https://consumerist.com/2017/05/23/passengers-say-commuter-rail-app-illegally-collects-personal-user-data/" title="Passengers Say Commuter Rail App Illegally Collects Personal User Data, unter: Consumerist.com 2017.">beschnüffeln Nutzer</a>. 
168 ??? (study) http://people.cs.vt.edu/danfeng/papers/AsiaCCS-17-Yao.pdf
| Faceapp appears to do lots of surveillance, judging by <a
| [-href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-intersect/wp/2017/04/26/everything-thats-wrong-with-faceapp-the-latest-creepy-photo-app-for-your-face/">-]
| {+href="https://web.archive.org/web/20170426191242/https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-intersect/wp/2017/04/26/everything-thats-wrong-with-faceapp-the-latest-creepy-photo-app-for-your-face/">+}
| how much access it demands to personal data in the device</a>. 
Faceapp appears to do lots of surveillance, judging by <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20170426191242/https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-intersect/wp/2017/04/26/everything-thats-wrong-with-faceapp-the-latest-creepy-photo-app-for-your-face/"> how much access it demands to personal data in the device</a>. 
<b>Faceapp</b> scheint eine Menge zu überwachen und zu beurteilen, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-intersect/wp/2017/04/26/everything-thats-wrong-with-faceapp-the-latest-creepy-photo-app-for-your-face/" title="Everything that’s wrong with FaceApp, the latest creepy photo app for your face, unter: washingtonpost.com 2017.">wie viel Zugang es auf persönliche Daten im Gerät einfordert</a>. 
169 https://www.spiegel.de/netzwelt/gadgets/bose-soll-mit-bose-connect-hoerverhalten-der-kunden-ausspaehen-a-1144134.html
| Users are suing Bose for <a
| [-href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2017/04/19/bose-headphones-have-been-spying-on-their-customers-lawsuit-claims/">-]
| {+href="https://web.archive.org/web/20170423010030/https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2017/04/19/bose-headphones-have-been-spying-on-their-customers-lawsuit-claims/">+}
| distributing a spyware app for its headphones</a>. Specifically, the app
| would record the names of the audio files users listen to along with the
| headphone's unique serial number. 
Users are suing Bose for <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20170423010030/https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2017/04/19/bose-headphones-have-been-spying-on-their-customers-lawsuit-claims/"> distributing a spyware app for its headphones</a>. Specifically, the app would record the names of the audio files users listen to along with the headphone's unique serial number. 
US-Nutzer verklagt Bose: <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2017/04/19/bose-headphones-have-been-spying-on-their-customers-lawsuit-claims/" title="Bose headphones have been spying on customers, lawsuit claims, unter: washingtonpost.com 2017.">App späht offenbar über Kopfhörer aus</a>, welche Musik gerade läuft, welche Hörbücher und Radiosender der Nutzer sich anhört u. a., und leitet die Informationen an Drittanbieter weiter. 
191  
Some portable phones <a href="http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/kryptowire-discovered-mobile-phone-firmware-that-transmitted-personally-identifiable-information-pii-without-user-consent-or-disclosure-300362844.html">are sold with spyware sending lots of data to China</a>. 
Mehrere Mobilgeräte <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20161116213010/http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/kryptowire-discovered-mobile-phone-firmware-that-transmitted-personally-identifiable-information-pii-without-user-consent-or-disclosure-300362844.html" title="Kryptowire Discovered Mobile Phone Firmware That Transmitted Personally Identifiable Information (PII) Without User Consent Or Disclosure, PRNewswire.com 2016 (Internet Archive).">senden große Datenmengen nach China</a>. 
192 | Facebook's new Magic Photo app <a
| [-href="http://www.theregister.co.uk/2015/11/10/facebook_scans_camera_for_your_friends/">scans-]
| {+href="https://www.theregister.co.uk/2015/11/10/facebook_scans_camera_for_your_friends/">
| scans+} your mobile phone's photo collections for known faces</a>, and
| suggests you [-to share-] {+circulate+} the picture you take according to
| who is in the frame. 
Facebook's new Magic Photo app <a href="https://www.theregister.co.uk/2015/11/10/facebook_scans_camera_for_your_friends/"> scans your mobile phone's photo collections for known faces</a>, and suggests you circulate the picture you take according to who is in the frame. 
Facebooks neue Magic Photo-App <a href="//www.theregister.co.uk/2015/11/10/facebook_scans_camera_for_your_friends/">untersucht die Foto-Sammlungen <em>Ihres</em> Mobiltelefons nach bekannten Gesichtern</a> und schlägt das gewählte Bild zu teilen vor, je nach dem wer sich in dem Ausschnitt befindet. 
195 | Facebook's app listens all the time, <a
| [-href="http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-and-tech/news/facebook-using-people-s-phones-to-listen-in-on-what-they-re-saying-claims-professor-a7057526.html">to-]
| {+href="https://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-and-tech/news/facebook-using-people-s-phones-listen-what-they-re-saying-claims-professor-a7057526.html">to+}
| snoop on what people are listening to or watching</a>. In addition, it may
| be analyzing people's conversations to serve them with targeted
| advertisements. 
Facebook's app listens all the time, <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-and-tech/news/facebook-using-people-s-phones-listen-what-they-re-saying-claims-professor-a7057526.html">to snoop on what people are listening to or watching</a>. In addition, it may be analyzing people's conversations to serve them with targeted advertisements. 
Facebooks App lauscht die ganze Zeit um <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-and-tech/news/facebook-using-people-s-phones-to-listen-in-on-what-they-re-saying-claims-professor-a7057526.html">auszuschnüffeln, was man anhört oder -guckt</a>. Darüber hinaus können Konversationen analysiert werden, um gezielte Werbung zu kredenzen. 
196  
A pregnancy test controller application not only can <a href="http://www.theverge.com/2016/4/25/11503718/first-response-pregnancy-pro-test-bluetooth-app-security"> spy on many sorts of data in the phone, and in server accounts, it can alter them too</a>. 
Ein Bluetooth-Schwangerschaftstest- App kann nicht nur viele <a href="//www.theverge.com/2016/4/25/11503718/first-response-pregnancy-pro-test-bluetooth-app-security" title="First Response's Bluetooth pregnancy test is intriguing — and a privacy nightmare, unter: TheVerge.com 2016.">Daten im Smartphone und in Server-Konten ausschnüffeln, sondern auch ändern</a>. 
197 | Apps that include <a
| [-href="http://techaeris.com/2016/01/13/symphony-advanced-media-software-tracks-your-digital-life-through-your-smartphone-mic/">-]
| {+href="https://web.archive.org/web/20180913014551/http://techaeris.com/2016/01/13/symphony-advanced-media-software-tracks-your-digital-life-through-your-smartphone-mic/">+}
| Symphony surveillance software snoop on what radio and TV programs are
| playing nearby</a>. Also on what users post on various sites such as
| Facebook, Google+ and Twitter. 
Apps that include <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20180913014551/http://techaeris.com/2016/01/13/symphony-advanced-media-software-tracks-your-digital-life-through-your-smartphone-mic/"> Symphony surveillance software snoop on what radio and TV programs are playing nearby</a>. Also on what users post on various sites such as Facebook, Google+ and Twitter. 
Apps <ins>mit enthaltener <a href="//techaeris.com/2016/01/13/symphony-advanced-media-software-tracks-your-digital-life-through-your-smartphone-mic/" title="Alex Hernandez, Symphony Advanced Media Software Tracks Your Digital Life Through Your Smartphone Mic, Techaeris 2016.">Symphony-Überwachungssoftware schnüffeln in Echtzeit aus</a>, Radio- und Fernsehsendungen oder was auch immer ausgeschnüffelt werden soll</ins>. Auch auf was Nutzer auf verschiedenen Internetpräsenzen wie Facebook, Google+ und Twitter schreiben. 
198  
The natural extension of monitoring people through &ldquo;their&rdquo; phones is <a href="http://www.northwestern.edu/newscenter/stories/2016/01/fool-activity-tracker.html"> proprietary software to make sure they can't &ldquo;fool&rdquo; the monitoring</a>. 
Der natürliche verlängerte Arm der Überwachung der Menschen mittels „ihrer” Smartphones ist <a href="//www.northwestern.edu/newscenter/stories/2016/01/fool-activity-tracker.html" title="Marla Paul, You Can’t Fool This Activity Tracker, Northwestern University 2016.">proprietäre Software, um sicherstellen zu können, dass sie die Überwachung nicht „austricksen“</a>. 
199  
&ldquo;Cryptic communication,&rdquo; unrelated to the app's functionality, was <a href="http://news.mit.edu/2015/data-transferred-android-apps-hiding-1119"> found in the 500 most popular gratis Android apps</a>. 
<a href="//news.mit.edu/2015/data-transferred-android-apps-hiding-1119" title="Larry Hardesty, What are your apps hiding?, MIT News Office 2015.">In 500 der beliebtesten gratis Android-Apps</a> wurde „kryptische Kommunikation“, ohne Bezug auf App-Funktionalität gefunden. 
202 | More than 73% and 47% of mobile applications, [-both from-] {+for+}
| Android and iOS respectively <a
| [-href="http://jots.pub/a/2015103001/index.php">share-]
| {+href="https://techscience.org/a/2015103001/">hand over+} personal,
| behavioral and location information</a> of their users [-with-] {+to+}
| third parties. 
More than 73% and 47% of mobile applications, for Android and iOS respectively <a href="https://techscience.org/a/2015103001/">hand over personal, behavioral and location information</a> of their users to third parties. 
Mehr als 73 % und 47 % der populärsten Android- und iOS-Apps <a href="//jots.pub/a/2015103001/index.php">teilen persönliche sowie Verhaltens- und Positionsinformationem</a> ihrer Nutzer mit Dritten. 
203  
According to Edward Snowden, <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-34444233">agencies can take over smartphones</a> by sending hidden text messages which enable them to turn the phones on and off, listen to the microphone, retrieve geo-location data from the GPS, take photographs, read text messages, read call, location and web browsing history, and read the contact list. This malware is designed to disguise itself from investigation. 
<a href="//www.bbc.com/news/uk-34444233">Behörden können Smartphones per versteckter Textnachrichten übernehmen</a>, wodurch diese ein- bzw. ausgeschaltet, das Mikrofon abgehört, Geo-Positionsdaten via GPS abgerufen, fotografiert, SMS-Nachrichten, Telefonate, Positions- und Webbrowser-Verläufe und die Kontakte ausgelesen werden können, so Edward Snowden. Dieses Schadprogramm ist so entworfen, bei Untersuchungen etwas völlig anderes vorzugaukeln. 
204  
Like most &ldquo;music screaming&rdquo; disservices, Spotify is based on proprietary malware (DRM and snooping). In August 2015 it <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/aug/21/spotify-faces-user-backlash-over-new-privacy-policy"> demanded users submit to increased snooping</a>, and some are starting to realize that it is nasty. 
Wie die meisten „Musik schreienden“ Bärendienste basiert <b>Spotify</b> auf proprietärer Schadsoftware: DRM und Schnüffeln. Im August 2015 wurden <a href="//www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/aug/21/spotify-faces-user-backlash-over-new-privacy-policy" title="Spotify's chief executive apologises after user backlash over new privacy policy, unter: www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/aug/21/spotify-faces-user-backlash-over-new-privacy-policy 2015.">Nutzer aufgefordert einem Blanko-Brief zum Datenzugriff zuzustimmen</a>, und so manche beginnen zu begreifen, dass es Übel ist. 
205 | This article shows the <a
| href="http{+s+}://www.theregister.co.uk/2015/08/21/spotify_worse_than_the_nsa/">
| twisted ways that they present snooping as a way to &ldquo;serve&rdquo;
| users better</a>&mdash;never mind whether they want that. This is a
| typical example of the attitude of the proprietary software industry
| towards those they have subjugated. 
This article shows the <a href="https://www.theregister.co.uk/2015/08/21/spotify_worse_than_the_nsa/"> twisted ways that they present snooping as a way to &ldquo;serve&rdquo; users better</a>&mdash;never mind whether they want that. This is a typical example of the attitude of the proprietary software industry towards those they have subjugated. 
Dieser Artikel erläutert die <a href="//www.theregister.co.uk/2015/08/21/spotify_worse_than_the_nsa/" title="Spotify now officially even worse than the NSA, unter: www.theregister.co.uk/2015/08/21/spotify_worse_than_the_nsa/ 2015.">verworrenen Richtungen das Ausspionieren als eine Möglichkeit zu präsentieren, Nutzer besser zu „dienen“</a>&#160;&#8209;&#160;egal, ob sie das wollen. Dies ist ein typisches Beispiel für die Haltung der proprietären Softwareindustrie gegenüber denjenigen, die sie unterjocht haben. 
207  
Samsung phones come with <a href="http://arstechnica.com/gadgets/2015/07/samsung-sued-for-loading-devices-with-unremovable-crapware-in-china/">apps that users can't delete</a>, and they send so much data that their transmission is a substantial expense for users. Said transmission, not wanted or requested by the user, clearly must constitute spying of some kind. 
Samsung-Smartphones werden mit <a href="//arstechnica.com/gadgets/2015/07/samsung-sued-for-loading-devices-with-unremovable-crapware-in-china/" title="Samsung sued for loading devices with unremovable crapware (in China), unter: arstechnica.com 2015.">Applikationen, die Nutzer nicht entfernen können</a> vorinstalliert, und sie senden so viel Daten, deren Übermittlung erhebliche Kosten verursacht. Die besagte Übermittlung, nicht vom Nutzer gewollt oder abgefordert, stellt eindeutig eine Art von Ausspionieren dar. 
208 | <a
| [-href="http://www.privmetrics.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/wisec2015.pdf">A-]
| {+href="https://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~arb33/papers/FerreiraEtAl-Securacy-WiSec2015.pdf">
| A+} study in 2015</a> found that 90% of the top-ranked gratis proprietary
| Android apps contained recognizable tracking libraries. For the paid
| proprietary apps, it was only 60%. 
<a href="https://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~arb33/papers/FerreiraEtAl-Securacy-WiSec2015.pdf"> A study in 2015</a> found that 90% of the top-ranked gratis proprietary Android apps contained recognizable tracking libraries. For the paid proprietary apps, it was only 60%. 
Eine <a href="http://www.privmetrics.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/wisec2015.pdf" title="Short: A Measurement Study of Tracking in Paid Mobile Applications, unter: http://www.privmetrics.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/wisec2015.pdf 2015." type="application/pdf">Studie aus 2015</a> ergab, dass 90 % der Top-Rankings kostenloser proprietärer Android-Apps erkennbare Tracking-Bibliotheken enthielten. Für die nicht kostenlosen proprietären Apps waren es nur 60 %. 
210 || No change detected. The change might only be in amounts of spaces. 
Gratis Android apps (but not <a href="/philosophy/free-sw.html">free software</a>) connect to 100 <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/may/06/free-android-apps-connect-tracking-advertising-websites">tracking and advertising</a> URLs, on the average. 
Gratis Android-Anwendungen (die jedoch keine <a href="/philosophy/free-sw">Freie Software</a> darstellen), stellen für <a href="//www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/may/06/free-android-apps-connect-tracking-advertising-websites" title=" Free Android apps connect to thousands of tracking and ad URLs, research shows, unter: theguardian.com 2015.">Verfolgungs- und Werbezwecke</a> durchschnittlich zu mehr als 100 Internetadressen eine Verbindung her. 
213  
Many proprietary apps for mobile devices report which other apps the user has installed. <a href="http://techcrunch.com/2014/11/26/twitter-app-graph/">Twitter is doing this in a way that at least is visible and optional</a>. Not as bad as what the others do. 
Viele proprietäre Mobilgeräte-Applikationen melden, welche anderen Applikationen eine Nutzerin oder Nutzer installiert hat. <a href="//techcrunch.com/2014/11/26/twitter-app-graph/" title="Twitter’s New App Tracking Capabilities To Help Personalize User Experience, Benefit Advertisers, unter: techcrunch.com 2014.">Twitter tut dies auf eine Weise, die zumindest erkennbar und optional ist</a>. Nicht so schlimm wie das, was andere tun.  
214  
<a href="/proprietary/proprietary-back-doors.html#samsung"> Samsung's back door</a> provides access to any file on the system. 
<a href="/proprietary/proprietary-back-doors#samsung">Samsungs Hintertür</a> ermöglicht Zugriff auf beliebige Dateien im System. 
215  
The Simeji keyboard is a smartphone version of Baidu's <a href="/proprietary/proprietary-surveillance.html#baidu-ime">spying <abbr title="Input Method Editor">IME</abbr></a>. 
 
216 | The nonfree Snapchat app's principal purpose is to restrict the use of
| data on the user's computer, but it does surveillance too: <a
| href="http://www.theguardian.com/media/2013/dec/27/snapchat-may-be-exposed-hackers">
| it tries to get the user's list of other people's phone [-numbers.</a>-]
| {+numbers</a>.+} 
The nonfree Snapchat app's principal purpose is to restrict the use of data on the user's computer, but it does surveillance too: <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/media/2013/dec/27/snapchat-may-be-exposed-hackers"> it tries to get the user's list of other people's phone numbers</a>. 
Hauptzweck der unfreien <ins>Instant-Messaging</ins>-App <em>Snapchat</em> ist die Datennutzung auf dem Rechner des Nutzers zu beschränken, aber gleichzeitig überwacht sie auch: <a href="//www.theguardian.com/media/2013/dec/27/snapchat-may-be-exposed-hackers" title="Snapchat users' phone numbers may be exposed to hackers, unter: theguardian.com 2013.">sie versucht an die Telefonnummern anderer Kontakte zu gelangen</a>. 
217 | The Brightest Flashlight app <a
| href="http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2013/dec/06/android-app-50m-downloads-sent-data-advertisers">
| sends user data, including geolocation, for use by [-companies.</a>-]
| {+companies</a>.+} 
The Brightest Flashlight app <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2013/dec/06/android-app-50m-downloads-sent-data-advertisers"> sends user data, including geolocation, for use by companies</a>. 
Die Taschenlampen-App <b>Brightest Flashlight Free</b> hat <a href="//www.theguardian.com/technology/2013/dec/06/android-app-50m-downloads-sent-data-advertisers" title="Android torch app with over 50m downloads silently sent user location and device data to advertisers, unter: theguardian.com 2013.">unerlaubt Nutzerdaten sowie Aufenthaltsort gespeichert und an Werbenetzwerke gesendet</a>.<a href="#tn07" id="tn07-ref" class="transnote">[7]</a> 
219 (redirect) -> https://www.aclu.org/how-government-tracking-your-movements
| Portable phones with GPS {+<a
| href="http://www.aclu.org/government-location-tracking-cell-phones-gps-devices-and-license-plate-readers">+}
| will send their GPS location on remote command{+,+} and users cannot stop
| [-them: <a
| href="http://www.aclu.org/government-location-tracking-cell-phones-gps-devices-and-license-plate-readers">
| http://www.aclu.org/government-location-tracking-cell-phones-gps-devices-and-license-plate-readers</a>.-]
| {+them</a>.+} (The US says it will eventually require all new portable
| phones to have GPS.) 
Portable phones with GPS <a href="http://www.aclu.org/government-location-tracking-cell-phones-gps-devices-and-license-plate-readers"> will send their GPS location on remote command, and users cannot stop them</a>. (The US says it will eventually require all new portable phones to have GPS.) 
Smartphones mit GPS senden per Fernzugriff auf Befehl ihren GPS-Standort, und Benutzer können dies nicht unterbinden: <a href="//www.aclu.org/government-location-tracking-cell-phones-gps-devices-and-license-plate-readers" title="How the Government Is Tracking Your Movements, unter: aclu.org.">//www.aclu.org/government-location-tracking-cell-phones-gps-devices-and-license-plate-readers</a> (die USA sagen, sie werden letzten Endes verlangen, dass alle neuen mobilen Telefone GPS haben). 
220  
FTC says most mobile apps for children don't respect privacy: <a href="http://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2012/12/ftc-disclosures-severely-lacking-in-kids-mobile-appsand-its-getting-worse/"> http://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2012/12/ftc-disclosures-severely-lacking-in-kids-mobile-appsand-its-getting-worse/</a>. 
Laut US-Wettbewerbsaufsichtsbehörde FTC respektieren die meisten mobilen Applikationen für Kinder nicht die Privatsphäre: <a href="//arstechnica.com/information-technology/2012/12/ftc-disclosures-severely-lacking-in-kids-mobile-appsand-its-getting-worse/" title="FTC: disclosures severely lacking in kids’ mobile apps—and it’s getting worse, unter: arstechnica.com 2012.">Mobile Apps für Kinder: immer noch nicht die Qualität</a>. 
221 | Some manufacturers add a <a
| href="http://androidsecuritytest.com/features/logs-and-services/loggers/carrieriq/">
| hidden general surveillance package such as Carrier [-IQ.</a>-] {+IQ</a>.+} 
Some manufacturers add a <a href="http://androidsecuritytest.com/features/logs-and-services/loggers/carrieriq/"> hidden general surveillance package such as Carrier IQ</a>. 
Einige Hersteller fügen ein <a href="//androidsecuritytest.com/features/logs-and-services/loggers/carrieriq/" title="What is Carrier IQ?, unter: androidsecuritytest.com 2011.">verstecktes allgemeines Überwachungspaket wie <b>Carrier IQ</b></a> hinzu. 
223 | [-<a href="#jails">Jails</a>&mdash;systems-]{+Jails are systems+} that
| impose censorship on application programs. 
Jails are systems that impose censorship on application programs. 
<a href="#jails">Gefängnisse</a><br />&#8209;&#160;Systeme, die Anwendungsprogrammen Zensur auferlegen. 
224 | <a
| [-href="http://www.itworld.com/article/2832657/operating-systems/microsoft-metro-app-store-lock-down.html">-]
| {+href="https://web.archive.org/web/20190917162027/https://www.itworld.com/article/2832657/microsoft-metro-app-store-lock-down.html">+}
| Windows 8 on &ldquo;mobile devices&rdquo; (now defunct) was a jail</a>. 
<a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20190917162027/https://www.itworld.com/article/2832657/microsoft-metro-app-store-lock-down.html"> Windows 8 on &ldquo;mobile devices&rdquo; (now defunct) was a jail</a>. 
<a href="https://www.itworld.com/article/2832657/operating-systems/microsoft-metro-app-store-lock-down.html" title="Microsoft Metro app store lock down, IDG Communications 2018.">Windows&#160;8 auf „Mobilgeräten“ <em>war</em> ein Gefängnis.</a> 
226 | [-<a href="#tyrants">Tyrants</a>&mdash;systems-]{+Tyrants are systems+}
| that reject any operating system not &ldquo;authorized&rdquo; by the
| manufacturer. 
Tyrants are systems that reject any operating system not &ldquo;authorized&rdquo; by the manufacturer. 
<a href="#tyrants">Tyrannen</a><br />&#8209;&#160;Systeme, die jedes nicht vom Hersteller „autorisierte“ Betriebssystem zurückweisen. 
227 | <a href="http{+s+}://fsf.org/campaigns/secure-boot-vs-restricted-boot/">
| Mobile devices that come with Windows 8 are tyrants</a>. [-<a
| href="http://www.itworld.com/operating-systems/301057/microsoft-metro-app-store-lockdown">
| Windows 8 on &ldquo;mobile devices&rdquo; is a jail.</a>-] 
<a href="https://fsf.org/campaigns/secure-boot-vs-restricted-boot/"> Mobile devices that come with Windows 8 are tyrants</a>. 
<a href="//fsf.org/campaigns/secure-boot-vs-restricted-boot/" title="Will your computer’s ‚Secure Boot‘ turn out to be ‚Restricted Boot‘?, unter: fsf.org 2011.">Mobilgeräte mit Windows 8 sind Tyrannen</a>. <a href="//www.itworld.com/operating-systems/301057/microsoft-metro-app-store-lockdown" title="Microsoft Metro app store lock down, unter: itworld.com 2012.">Windows 8 auf „Mobilgeräten“ ist ein Gefängnis</a>. 
228 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
! GNU should report facts briefly and crisply! Also resulting !
! consequences should not be swept away by an own opinion! !
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
TRANSLATORS: Use space (SPC) as msgstr if you don't have notes. 
*GNUN-SLOT: TRANSLATOR'S NOTES* 
<p><strong>Anmerkungen des Übersetzungsteams</strong>:</p>
<ol id="transnote">
<li><p><strong>Weiterführende Referenzen</strong>:</p>
<ol style="list-style-type:none">
<li id="tn01"><a href="#tn01-ref">[1]</a> Der Spiegel, <cite><a
href="//www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-111320266.html">iSpy</a></cite>, unter: spiegel.de 2013. (abgerufen 2014-05-06)<br />
Spiegel Online, <cite><a
href="//www.spiegel.de/netzwelt/netzpolitik/nsa-kann-auch-iphone-blackberry-und-android-telefone-auslesen-a-920963.html">NSA-Affäre: „Champagner!“</a></cite>, unter: spiegel.de 2013. (abgerufen 2014-07-04)<br />
Spiegel Online, <cite><a
href="//www.spiegel.de/netzwelt/netzpolitik/handy-ueberwachung-nsa-greift-milliardenfach-standortdaten-ab-a-937330.html">NSA-Skandal: Handy-Überwachung auf dem ganzen Planeten</a></cite>, unter: spiegel.de 2013. (abgerufen 2014-07-04)</li>
<li id="tn02"><a href="#tn02-ref">[2]</a> Heise Online, <cite><a
href="//heise.de/-211807">Google kann Android-Anwendungen löschen</a></cite>, unter: heise.de 2008. (abgerufen 2014-07-04)</li>
<li id="tn03"><a href="#tn03-ref">[3]</a> Heise Online, <cite><a
href="//heise.de/-1029709">Googles Einfluss auf Android-Handys</a></cite>, unter: heise.de 2010. (abgerufen 2014-07-04)</li>
<li id="tn04"><a href="#tn04-ref">[4]</a> Heise Online, <cite><a
href="//heise.de/-1028907">Google löscht Android-App auf Smartphones aus der Ferne</a></cite>, unter: heise.de 2010. (abgerufen 2014-07-04)</li>
<li id="tn05"><a href="#tn05-ref">[5]</a> WinFuture, <cite><a
href="//winfuture.de/news,90931.html">Error 53: Unautorisierte Ersatzteile legen Apple iPhone lahm</a></cite>, unter: winfuture.de 2016. (abgerufen 2017-04-12)</li>
<li id="malicious-wifi"><a href="#malicious-wifi-ref">[6]</a> Golem, <cite><a
href="//www.golem.de/news/broadcom-sicherheitsluecke-vom-wlan-chip-das-smartphone-uebernehmen-1704-127287.html">Vom WLAN-Chip das Smartphone übernehmen</a></cite>, unter: golem.de 2017. (abgerufen 2017-04-27)</li>
<li id="tn2017a-eurosp"><a href="#tn2017a-eurosp-ref">[7]</a> Arp, Quiring, Wressnegger, Rieck (2017), <cite><a
href="https://www.sec.cs.tu-bs.de/pubs/2017a-eurosp.pdf" type="application/pdf">Privacy Threats through Ultrasonic Side Channels on Mobile Devices</a></cite>, unter: https://www.sec.cs.tu-bs.de/pubs/2017a-eurosp.pdf. (abgerufen 2017-05-09)</li>
<li id="tn3704642"><a href="#tn3704642-ref">[8]</a> Stefan Krempl (2017), <cite><a
href="https://heise.de/-3704642">Tracking: Forscher finden Ultraschall-Spyware in 234 Android-Apps</a></cite>, unter: https://heise.de/-3704642. (abgerufen 2017-05-09)</li>
</ol></li></ol> 
230 || No change detected. The change might only be in amounts of spaces. 
Please see the <a href="/server/standards/README.translations.html">Translations README</a> for information on coordinating and contributing translations of this article. 
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232  
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Dieses Werk ist lizenziert unter einer <a rel="license" href="//creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/deed.de">Creative Commons Namensnennung 4.0 International</a>-Lizenz.